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THE DARK SIDE OF TOWN: THE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
REVOLUTION IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LAW 
Stephanie M. Stern* 
Social capital has pervaded property law, with scholars and policy-
makers advocating laws and property arrangements to promote social 
capital and relying on social capital to devolve property governance 
from legal institutions to resident groups. This Article challenges the 
prevailing view of social capital’s salutary effects with a more skeptical 
account that examines the dark side of residential social capital—its ca-
pacity to effectuate local factions and to promote restraints and inegali-
tarianism that close off property. I introduce a set of claims about social 
capital’s dark side in residential property and explore these points 
through the examples of local racial purging, land cartels, and residential 
self-governance. First, contrary to the assumption of a social capital def-
icit, residential racial segregation and land cartelization, perhaps the 
deepest imprints on the American property landscape today, suggest an 
abundance of local social capital and possible unintended consequences 
of interventions to build social capital. Second, “governing by social 
capital,” or relying on social capital for property self-governance, may 
empower factions, breed conflict, and increase the demand for residen-
tial homogeneity as a proxy for cooperation. In light of the mixed evi-
dence for social capital’s benefits and its sizeable dark side, the more 
pressing and productive role for property law is not to promote social 
capital, but to address its negative spillovers and illiberal effects.  
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INTRODUCTION 
N 2007, accompanied by a firestorm of publicity, Robert Putnam an-
nounced that residential racial diversity causes declines in social capi-
tal.1 Social capital is a prominent theory, popularized by Putnam, of the 
aggregate value of citizen participation in associations and organiza-
tions, social ties and networks, civic engagement, trust, and norms of 
reciprocity.2 In a study of forty-one U.S. communities, Putnam found 
that people living in racially diverse communities were less likely to 
work on a community project or volunteer, less likely to expect others to 
cooperate to solve collective problems, reported lower trust in others, 
had fewer close friendship ties, expressed less confidence in local gov-
1 See Robert D. Putnam, E. Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first 
Century, 30 Scandinavian Pol. Stud. 137, 144, 149–50 (2007). 
2 See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 19 (2000). 
I
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ernment, and registered to vote less frequently.3 Most provocatively, 
Putnam found a strong “hunker[ing] down” effect, contrary to both the 
constrict and contact hypotheses of integration, where racial diversity 
caused residents of diverse communities to withdraw from social and 
civic life and to report lower trust in members of other races and their 
own race.4  
 Unsurprisingly (to all but Robert Putnam, it seems), his research pro-
voked a torrent of political commentary and academic response. Con-
servative commentators argued that the findings called into question the 
value of racial mixing, headlines trumpeted the conclusion that “greater 
diversity equals more misery,”5 and Putnam’s research featured in a re-
cent amicus brief as evidence against the value of affirmative action in 
college admissions.6 Sociologists and economists reanalyzed Putnam’s 
data and conducted their own empirical studies to assess his findings 
(these studies indicate that the diversity decrement is statistically signifi-
cant, but small).7 Legal scholars accepted, albeit unhappily, the conclu-
sion that racial diversity diminishes local social capital.8 
3 After controlling for a host of variables at both the census-tract and individual level, in-
cluding age, ethnicity, education, affluence/poverty, language, residential mobility, citizen-
ship, commuting time, homeownership, region, gender, financial satisfaction, work hours, 
crime, population density, and income inequality, there were reductions in social capital as 
high as thirty to fifty percent for the most diverse communities as compared to the least di-
verse. See Putnam, supra note 1, at 148, 151–52. 
4 See id. at 147–49. 
 5 Ilana Mercer, Op-Ed., Greater Diversity Equals More Misery, Orange County Reg., July 
22, 2007, available at http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/putnam-59065-diversity-social.
html (“When an academic ‘discovers’ what ordinary mortals have known for eons, it’s called 
science.”). 
6 See Brief of Abigail Thernstrom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11–
13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (May 29, 2012) (arguing that Putnam’s research re-
veals social harms that do not support contact theory and the claimed benefits to diversity); 
see also David Brooks, Op-Ed., The End of Integration, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2007, at A15; 
Georgie Anne Geyer, The Case Against Multiculturalism, Free Republic (Aug. 14, 2007, 
2:02 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1881086/posts; Michael Jonas, The 
Downside of Diversity, Bos. Globe, Aug. 5, 2007, at D1, D3 (describing reaction of con-
servative think tank the Manhattan Institute and describing Putnam’s “inconvenient truth”). 
But see Brief of Dr. Robert D. Putnam as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (Aug. 13, 2012) (claiming long-term benefits of diversi-
ty not captured by his recent data).  
7 See infra note 159.  
8 See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the So-
cial Capital Response, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 271, 280 (2008) [hereinafter Brescia, Capital] 
(citing Putnam’s work on racial and ethnic diversity and stating that “[i]n more heterogene-
ous communities, social capital is harder to develop”); Robert C. Ellickson, The False Prom-
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Curiously, in the handwringing about the harms to social capital from 
diversity, no one questioned whether the problem was social capital it-
self. From a property scholar’s perspective, one plausible interpretation 
of the correlation between high social capital and low diversity is that 
high social capital reduces the costs of excluding minorities (that is, the 
non-dominant race in a community) and maintaining racial homogenei-
ty.9 Holding preferences for racial homogeneity constant and positive, 
there may be reverse causation: high social capital, in the form of close 
social networks and strong tastes for organizational participation and 
voluntary action, may facilitate community organizing to exclude by 
race or class through both informal and legal mechanisms.10 The motiva-
tion for exclusion may be preferences for homogeneity, increased prop-
erty values from exclusionary land use policies, or in predominantly mi-
nority, lower-income areas, concerns that white gentrification will make 
housing unaffordable. Conversely, low social capital may make it diffi-
cult for residents to organize to exclude and may result in greater racial 
fractionalization. 
The point of this discussion is not to establish a definitive, exclusive, 
or even likely explanation for the finding of a negative correlation be-
tween diversity and social capital. There are multiple possible explana-
tions and potential omitted variables in that research and any causal role 
ise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 1014–15 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing]; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 43, 43–52 (2012); James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the 
Phases of Community Evolution after World War II in the United States, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 
575, 600 (2008) (noting that “the politically correct rhetoric that we celebrate diversity fails 
to reflect the Nation’s beliefs”); Florence Wagman Roisman, Living Together: Ending Ra-
cial Discrimination and Segregation in Housing, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 507, 519 (2008) (describing 
scholarly and popular reactions to Putnam’s research); Peter Schuck, In Diversity We (Sorta) 
Trust, Am. Law., Dec. 2007, at 83–84 (describing Putnam’s research as “very important in 
providing a firm empirical confirmation of what many close students of diversity thought we 
already knew”). 
9 High social capital could be randomly distributed or more likely endogenously related to 
other community features, or the result of high social capital types self-selecting into com-
munities with like-minded residents. In practice, it is likely that this effect is strongest in 
predominantly white communities as middle and upper class whites generally tout high so-
cial capital scores—a fact which raises the question of an omitted variable effect. See infra 
Section I.B. 
10 For example, exclusionary zoning may work most effectively in communities with high 
social capital that cannot only zone ex ante but hold the line against developers’ efforts to 
circumvent zoning. See infra Section II.B. 
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for social capital may be partial.11 Instead, the aim of this thought exper-
iment is to illustrate how social capital can close off residential property 
by reducing supply or constraining who may access the supply. Rather 
than worrying about diversity’s harms to social capital, perhaps we 
should be concerned about social capital’s harms to diversity—and to 
residential property. 
Social capital is an influential theory of the value of participation in 
organizations, social ties and networks, civic engagement and voting, 
trust, and norms of reciprocity to economic and political flourishing. 
Putnam analogizes social capital to more traditional forms of capital: 
“Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital 
refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections 
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them.”12 Social capital exponents claim 
that social capital operates as a group-level positive externality that 
promotes national and local economic growth, better health and educa-
tion outcomes, and, more tautologically, collective action and democrat-
ic participation.13 While not blind to the potential ill effects and negative 
externalities of social capital, Putnam and other social capitalists ad-
vance social capital as a positive public good and an indicator of com-
munity prosperity.14 Local social capital is principally a theory of social 
cohesion, or bonding capital, and the capacity of residential groups to 
produce public goods without the guiding hand of state or Keynesian in-
tervention—a social science-infused theory of residential gemein-
schaft.15 
11 For example, low social capital in racially diverse areas, which are disproportionately 
low-income, may also reflect resident discontent with economic entrapment in low-status or 
non-white neighborhoods. Whites in diverse communities may express greater distrust of 
blacks or other minorities because their prejudice is more salient in a diverse community, 
and they may express greater distrust of other whites because of their frustration with their 
living situation. Also, selection into diverse communities, which are often of lower-status 
and wealth, may reflect lower ex ante social capital that limits access to information about 
housing opportunities and reduces capacity to handle the stresses of relocation.  
12 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 19. 
13 See id. at 289–90. 
14 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collec-
tive Action 36 (1990); The Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Harvard Ken-
nedy School, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (describing so-
cial capital policy initiatives, community-building, and research). 
15 Unlike Putnam’s, other sociological theories of social capital focus on status and power 
differences in their social capital construct and analyses. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Foun-
dations of Social Theory 300–18 (1990). Pierre Bourdieu, an earlier theorist, conceptualized 
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In the past decade, there has been a remarkable ascendance of social 
capital theory in property scholarship and law, a trend that has not been 
examined to date.16 The underspecified and encompassing nature of so-
cial capital makes it simultaneously attractive to property scholars and 
dangerous to theory—part of the appeal of social capital is that it is ca-
pacious enough to justify a breadth of agendas.17 Property scholars have 
become enthusiastic social capitalists,18 writing about how home mort-
gage reform, land use law, homeownership, block-level governance, 
school finance, process restrictions on eminent domain, and laws gov-
erning common interest communities can promote, or capitalize upon, 
social capital.19 Social capital has also had far-ranging influence over 
social capital as an individual asset generated by not only personal and group ties, but also 
institutionalized relationships, impersonal networks of material or cultural exchange, and 
class-based social status distinctions. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in Hand-
book of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education 241, 248–49 (John G. Richard-
son ed., 1986).  
16 Beyond property, legal articles in fields ranging from federalism to family law have 
considered how law can increase social capital. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital 
Argument for Federalism, 11 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 27, 42 (2001); Jason Mazzone, Towards 
a Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessons from Collaborative Reproduction, 39 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 1, 60–75 (1998) (arguing that family law should maintain family, rather than com-
munity, social capital); Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2055, 2063 (1996). 
17 For example, William Fischel maintains that local public schools, unlike voucher 
schools, enhance the flow of information and collective action by building social capital 
among geographically proximate parents, while Margaret Brinig and Nicole Garnett contend 
that extending voucher-based education to private Catholic schools increases social capital 
and collective efficacy in areas surrounding parish schools. See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole 
Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and Education Reform, 85 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 887, 925–28 (2010); William A. Fischel, Why Voters Veto Vouchers: Public 
Schools and Community-Specific Social Capital, 7 Econ. of Governance 109, 113–16 
(2006). 
18 I use the term social capitalist descriptively to refer to exponents of social capital, not to 
suggest a perfect parallel with economic capitalism or capital.  
19 See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing: Revisiting Culture, Urban Space, 
Power, and Law, 63 Hastings L.J. 803, 825–26 (2012); Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273; 
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L.J. 75, 83–84 
(1998) [hereinafter Ellickson, New Institutions]; Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological 
Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 527, 530–43 (2006) (ex-
ploring how local land use law affects urban social capital); Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take 
a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 Vill. 
L. Rev. 553, 588 (2002) (arguing that developer-created laws governing common interest 
communities and common regulatory practices of homeowners associations chill needed so-
cial capital); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Correcting for Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments 
and the Re-Balancing of Power Between “Desperate” Cities, Corporate Interests, and the 
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property policy, with local zoning and planning for social capital, federal 
Hope VI funding for low-income housing requiring social capital-
enhancing design features, homeownership subsidies justified on social 
capital grounds, experiments with “neighborhood direct democracy” and 
block associations, and World Bank development policy to build social 
capital.20 Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom has been an influential pro-
ponent of the importance of social capital to avoid tragedies of the 
commons and enable successful community governance of natural re-
sources.21 
There are two threads to the theoretical account of social capital in the 
property scholarship. First, property law should promote social capital in 
residential communities on the theory that robust social capital benefits 
local institutions and residents, and, in some accounts, spills over to ad-
vantage national democracy and economic growth. Property law can af-
firmatively build social capital by promoting interpersonal interaction, 
mutual reliance, or residential stability—at which point law should re-
cede.22 In some accounts, the omission or downscaling of formal law en-
courages cooperation and lessens the risk that ham-handed laws will suf-
focate the delicate shoots of growing social capital.23 Second, and 
somewhat circularly, social capital fuels successful property institutions 
and enables devolution of governance and public and private goods pro-
vision to resident groups.24 The unifying strand of these narratives is that 
social capital, properly nourished, produces positive externalities in an 
acceptably, if not perfectly, egalitarian manner and decreases the need 
for legal institutions. Following Putnam, property scholars take a func-
Average Joe, 16 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 187, 191 (2006) (proposing a Social Capital Im-
pact Assessment prior to a taking).  
20 See Matthew F. Filner, The Limits of Participatory Empowerment: Assessing the Min-
neapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program, 38 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 67, 67–70 (2006). 
See generally infra Section I.A. 
21 See Elinor Ostrom, Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?, in Social Capital: 
A Multifaceted Perspective 172, 173, 195–98 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 
2000). 
22 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
270–72 (1994) [hereinafter Ellickson, Order] (describing how law can promote relationships 
and repeat play necessary for informal social control); Franzese, supra note 19, at 591–92 
(noting that social capital can relieve formal institutions of burdens best left to informal net-
works).  
23 See Franzese, supra note 19, at 588; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 182. 
24 See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Franzese, supra note 19, at 
589–90. 
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tionalist (and tautological) approach: social capital is present when posi-
tive effects accrue.25 Notably, there appears to be no upward bound on 
the amount of social capital deemed optimal for communities. The im-
plicit message of social capital is more is always better. 
In this Article, I advance an account of the dark side of social capital 
in residential property. My critique of social capital focuses on “bonding 
capital” (that is, strong social ties, thick trust, and shared norms within 
cohesive communities) as the far more ubiquitous and theoretically cen-
tral form of social capital. I employ the terms social capital and bonding 
capital interchangeably throughout the paper. Social capital is an im-
portant factor effectuating, and sometimes creating, local factions with 
interests contrary to the public interest and the rights of other citizens 
that so concerned Madison.26 Networks, reciprocity, trust, tastes for par-
ticipation, and social ties facilitate collusion to restrain residential prop-
erty supply and to act on pre-existing preferences for illiberal exclu-
sion.27 Social capital can also create or heighten such preferences as 
collective action escalates individual commitments and dense, reciprocal 
ties lock in bad norms and stifle dissent.  
The enthusiasm for social capital has also obscured tradeoffs in the 
devolution of property governance to residential groups. Governing 
through social capital by resident groups can deliver cost-savings and 
benefits of local knowledge, but it may also directly empower factions, 
confine social exchange, and increase the demand for homogeneity.28 
Devolving governance and public goods provision to residents ratchets 
up the importance of cooperation in the face of inflated, and pervasive, 
25 Putnam’s fourteen-item composite measure does not adequately separate the determi-
nants of social capital from its consequences. Other definitions of social capital are also rid-
dled with conceptual ambiguity and circularity. See, e.g., Michael Woolcock, The Place of 
Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes, 2 Canadian J. Pol’y Res. 
11, 13 (2001) (giving a circular definition of social capital as “the norms and networks that 
facilitate collective action”); see also Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Ap-
plications in Modern Sociology, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 1, 19 (1998) (stating that social capital 
“leads to positive outcomes, such as economic development and less crime, and its existence 
is inferred from the same outcomes”).  
26 I thank Bruce Ackerman for his helpful insights and comments on factions and social 
capital.  
27 See, e.g., James DeFilippis, The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development, 12 
Housing Pol’y Debate 781, 792 (2001) (stating that ethnic enclaves “completely close[] off 
the market, and access to the market, to anyone who is not part of the ethnic group creating 
the enclave”).  
28 This happens in formal institutions and organizations as well, but subject to thicker legal 
constraints.  
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perceptions that similar others cooperate best (at times, promoting social 
capital has verged perilously close to engineering residential racial ho-
mogeneity). Social-capital mediated governance may also encourage il-
liberal internal distributions of property and governance roles as class- 
and characteristic-based social status serves as a quick and dirty alloca-
tion device to reduce the overwhelming coordination costs of collective 
action.29 
Social capital has masked these issues in its sunny language of socia-
bility and the promise that sufficient social capital self-corrects its own 
harms to a substantial degree. An antidote to harmful private-regarding 
norms and factions is to build more expansive and encompassing com-
munities of interest and mutual obligation. Social capital claims this so-
lution in the form of “bridging ties” across social and geographic divides 
which ostensibly inculcate public-regarding orientations and tolerance of 
diversity (and if this does not occur it is because more social capital 
must be fostered).30 Yet, we know little about how to build bridging ties 
in a way that will prevent or mitigate negative externalities from local 
social capital. And there is no evidence that diffusely constructed social 
capital, if achieved, will reliably trump tighter-knit bonding social capi-
tal, or that bridging ties will not morph into bonding capital. 
A question remains: are the problems I describe due to social capital 
or bad norms? The answer is both. The ill effects of social capital derive 
most frequently from its instrumental capacity to effectuate bad norms 
and socially harmful motivations. In the residential context, Americans’ 
excessive, undiversified investment in homeownership does not reliably 
inculcate extra-local civic virtue, and the norms attached to residential 
property imperfectly and inconsistently address broader social obliga-
tions and public citizenship.31 Social capital can also produce bad norms 
in two ways. First, it can create socially harmful preferences through the 
process of cooperating in repeated, often ideologically binding interac-
tions (the very promise of social capital).32 There is a wealth of evidence 
that forming or strengthening “in-groups” creates in-group favoritism, 
29 These points may underlie Carol Rose’s critiques of non-egalitarianism in Ostrom’s 
commons. See Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of Governing the 
Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 Int’l J. Commons 28, 44 (2011).  
30 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 22–24 (discussing bridging ties). 
31 See William Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 10–20 (2001).  
32 Another harm is from “downward leveling norms” in poor but solidaristic communities 
that impede individual economic advancement. See, e.g., Portes, supra note 25, at 17. 
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biases beliefs in favor of the group’s interests, and yields more extreme 
group action.33 Second, in my view, social capital reifies self-interested 
activity at the expense of broader public-regarding conceptions of the 
local resident-citizen role. Extra-local social obligations are less press-
ing, and the tradeoffs between group benefits and public harms less 
troubling, because local working-together yields national dividends. 
In developed market economies with established legal institutions, re-
lying on social capital to regulate residential property or sustain commu-
nity-governed property institutions with thin legal frameworks may be a 
second-best solution. Rather than diminish the role of formal law, abun-
dant social capital may increase the need for legal safeguards and, in 
some cases, the desirability of formal institutions. This is not to dismiss 
the work of Elinor Ostrom or Bob Ellickson, but rather to suggest that 
devolution from formal law and institutions to self-governing groups re-
quires a fuller accounting of social capital’s costs to residential life, 
property supply, and liberalism. Implicit in my account is also a skepti-
cal assessment of the claimed benefits of cohesive social capital to resi-
dential communities. After almost three decades of research, we know 
little about how to promote or extract positive social capital through 
property law or residential configurations—many attempts at social 
capital engineering have been fumbling and ill-fated.34 There is a sense, 
undoubtedly correct, that social ties, informal cooperation, and altruism 
within parent groups, congregations, and other groups can have social 
value. However, it is a leap from these voluntary, organic examples of 
social capital—often subject to thicker constraints or occurring in areas 
where government non-involvement is pivotal to social or personal iden-
tity—to relying on social capital to devolve property governance or 
structure property law. Indeed, the recent enthusiasm for social capital-
building and informal micro-governance may be a step backward to 
closed and private-minded societies—what Ferdinand Tönnies described 
33 See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 261–62 (1957); Irving L. 
Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fias-
coes 10–13 (1972); Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide 
42–44 (2009). 
34 See infra Section I.B. Other examples include urban renewal intended to create more 
socially healthy neighborhoods and mixed-use zoning to build social capital that instead ap-
pears to increase crime. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic So-
cial Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 
Am. J. Soc. 603, 603–11 (1999). 
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as gemeinschaft—that limit social exchange and sacrifice social progress 
and innovation for insularity.35 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the rise of social 
capital theory in residential property law and considers the empirical 
case for social capital. Part II examines the dark side of residential social 
capital and the role of social capital in racial and economic segregation 
and land cartels. Part III argues that devolution to resident groups, or 
governing by social capital, can empower factions and increase the de-
mand for residential homogeneity. To make my analysis more concrete, 
I assess proposals for neighborhood direct democracy programs, block-
level associations, and legal reform of common interest communities. In 
Part IV, I conclude that residential norms and roles offer weak con-
straints against social capital’s negative externalities. Part V considers 
the role of law with respect to social capital, offers preliminary thoughts 
on disaggregating social capital and the utility of its component parts, 
and addresses potential objections to my account. Because my analysis 
of the dark side of social capital follows from the underspecified con-
struct of social capital, it is, inescapably, coarse-grained. If social capi-
tal, and correspondingly my account of its negative externalities, ulti-
mately proves too vague or tautological, then perhaps we need to 
abandon social capital in property discourse. 
I. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION IN PROPERTY LAW 
With his evocatively titled book Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam cata-
pulted the theory of social capital to international fame. Social capital is 
the most recent iteration in a recurrent intellectual history of theories of 
solidaristic residential community—and laments of community lost.36 
Putnam lauds diverse “bridging social capital,” yet his work, and its up-
take in the social science and legal literature, focuses on dense and insu-
lar “bonding capital” and its positive, causal role in local and national 
outcomes.37 The major measurement tools for social capital emphasize 
35 See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society 30, 48 (Jose Harris ed., 2001). 
36 See Robert J. Sampson, Great American City 44–45 (2011) (describing social capital as 
part of a longstanding intellectual history of theories of community lost and an “ideology of 
lament” that has impeded serious sociological inquiry). 
37 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22; Citizendium Citizen Compendium, The Social Cap-
ital Foundation, http://www.socialcapital-foundation.org/TSCF/aboutus_citizendium.htm 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (stating social capital is the “semantic equivalent to the spirit of 
community”); see also Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and 
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tight-knittedness, social interaction, and participation of the type that of-
ten occurs in cohesive groups and communities.38 The generation and 
deployment of social capital lends itself to face-to-face interaction and 
organization at the local and sub-local level, where many theorists claim 
social capital plays its strongest role.39 Accordingly, my critique of so-
cial capital focuses on bonding capital. Bridging social capital is not 
immune from misuse (certain wars and political movements come to 
mind). However, on balance, bridging ties appear a less potent contribu-
tor to residential social ills and have some potential to reduce illiberal 
exclusion and anomie—points I return to in Part V. 
The modern-day resonance of social capital has deep roots in nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century thought. Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 theory 
of gemeinschaft elaborated the defining features of tight-knit, ideologi-
cally homogenous communities characterized by “natural will” and reg-
ulated informally by social bonds (gemeinschaft), and compared them to 
atomistic, diverse “associations” governed by rules and regulated com-
petition (gesellschaft).40 Emile Durkheim’s writing traced the evolution 
of societies from mechanistic, in-group solidarity to organic solidarity 
focused on the rights of individuals.41 Almost a century later, the Soli-
darity movement in Poland, rooted in a trade union that advocated 
sweeping social reform, declared the primacy of communal social rela-
tions in opposition to both state and market.42 Early discourse on social 
capital and community in America pursued similar themes of cohesive-
ness and engagement within local civil society. In 1835, de Tocqueville, 
now termed the “patron saint of contemporary social capitalists,” posited 
Public Life, 13 Am. Prospect 35, 36 (1993) (“Working together is easier in a community 
blessed with a substantial stock of social capital.”). 
38 Over three-quarters of the items in Putnam’s fourteen-item index capture, at least in 
part, local social cohesion. See Tristan Claridge, Measurement of Social Capital, Social Cap-
ital Research (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/literature/operational
isation/measurement.html. Alternative measures from other researchers and the World Bank 
similarly emphasize the context of the local community. See id.  
39 See infra Section I.A. 
40 Although Tönnies argued that gemeinschaft was the “childhood of humanity” and ge-
sellschaft its maturity, this point has been largely overlooked in the subsequent incorporation 
of gemeinschaft into communitarian movements. See Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: 
A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 Soc. Theory 1, 2 (2001).  
41 See generally Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893). 
42 See Brint, supra note 40, at 1. In recent years, the European Union has made social co-
hesion a goal, both across the EU and within residential communities. See Kath Hulse & 
Wendy Stone, Social Cohesion, Social Capital and Social Exclusion, 28 Pol’y Stud. 109, 117 
(2007). 
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that the high level of associational activity in America fostered civil so-
ciety and democracy.43 In 1916, state supervisor of rural schools L.J. 
Hanifan, later influential in the Social Center Movement, introduced the 
term social capital as the “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and 
social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make 
up a social unit.”44 Subsequently, the Community Studies Movement of 
the mid-twentieth century expanded on this conception of cohesion in 
residential communities and explored how participation and collective 
symbols create “place identity.”45 
A. Social Capital in Property Theory and Policy 
In the past decade, social capital has ascended in property theory as 
an aim of property law and, somewhat circularly, as a prerequisite for 
successful property institutions and group self-governance.46 If the clas-
sic Lockean debate is whether property predates government (thus that 
government’s purpose is to protect property), the question now is 
whether social capital precedes property, or the converse. The accounts 
in the property scholarship accept the validity of social capital and en-
dorse its narrative of positive effects.47 They differ, however, in the ideo-
logical bases of their affinity for social capital and whether proposals fo-
cus in earnest on social capital, as is often the case, or instead deploy 
social capital to substantiate other agendas. As in the broader discourse, 
the uptake of social capital into property law has focused on bonding so-
cial capital accumulation through group cooperation and social cohe-
sion.48 It is this sort of social cohesion, the refrain goes, that promotes 
43 Putnam, supra note 2, at 292. See generally Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Amer-
ica (1945). 
44 See L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 130, 130 (1916). 
45 Brint, supra note 40, at 5–6. For a classic work in the Community Studies Movement, 
see W. Lloyd Warner & Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (1941). 
46 See, e.g., supra notes 22–24. 
47 See supra notes 8 and 19. 
48 See, e.g., Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1014–15; Ellickson, New 
Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (common interest com-
munities); Ostrom, supra note 21, at 176 (defining social capital in her analysis of property 
self-governance systems as “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expec-
tations about patterns of interaction that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity”). 
Many accounts in sociology and political science also treat social capital as a theory of 
community. See, e.g., Brint, supra note 40, at 7 (“[S]ocial capital . . . emphasizes the inter-
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effective property governance, non-state resolution of collective action 
problems, and voluntary production of local goods.49 Sometimes there is 
a Mayberry retrospective flavor to these accounts where individuals, 
powered by social capital, not only produce positive externalities for 
communities but also lead more psychologically fulfilling lives.50 
Proposals abound for how to promote social capital through property 
law, with scholars variously positing roles for land use law, mixed-use 
zoning, social capital impact assessments of proposed land use changes 
or eminent domain, homeownership subsidies, foreclosure relief, and 
block-level residential associations.51 For example, in a detailed account 
of urban social capital, Sheila Foster writes about the role of land use 
law and shared urban commons in creating social capital.52 Anna di Ro-
bilant’s recent examination of common ownership claims an important 
role for property rights in community gardens in fostering social capi-
tal.53 At times it appears that property determinism is at play with out-
sized faith in the role of property configurations, such as New Urbanist 
communities or homeownership zones, to produce social capital.54 Often 
these accounts envision that once law has fostered a sufficient stock of 
social capital, legal institutions will take a backseat to efficient (and so-
cial capital-enhancing) group cooperation and private ordering.55 Work 
such as Paula Franzese’s proposals for reforming common interest 
communities and Bob Ellickson’s scholarship contend that over-
 
mixing of social relations and instrumental benefits, though it is closer to the community 
concept in focusing on the motives underlying social relations . . . .”).  
49 See Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1009; Franzese, supra note 19, 
at 560–62; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173, 198–99.  
50 See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy 60–63 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/anna_di_robilant/3 
(describing social capital benefits of community gardens). See generally Putnam, supra note 
2. 
51 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 19, at 852–64 (proposing social capital GIS mapping, 
foreclosure relief protection, eminent domain, and affordable housing to protect and promote 
place-based social capital); Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273–74 (mortgage crisis); 
Fischel, supra note 17, at 113–15 (education); Foster, supra note 19, at 530–46 (2006) (urban 
community development); Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (common interest communities). 
52 See Foster, supra note 19, at 530–42. 
53 See di Robilant, supra note 50, at 60 (asserting that community gardens are “crucial 
triggers of what scholars call a neighborhood’s ‘social capital’”). 
54 See Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions 28 
(1968) (critiquing physical determinism and overreliance on the capacity of urban planning 
to influence social outcomes). 
55 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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specified, heavy-handed, or power-centralizing laws crowd out social 
capital and norms.56 
Scholars also seek to maintain social capital against the erosive ef-
fects of laws and policies, and to formalize the accounting of social in-
terests alongside economic ones. Asmara Tekle Johnson and Lisa Alex-
ander propose mandatory social capital impact assessments prior to 
eminent domain or land use changes likely to damage social capital (the 
latter suggests GIS mapping of community social capital scores).57 In a 
similar vein, social capital justifies recent scholarly proposals for fore-
closure relief and mortgage-lending reform.58 More generally, Richard 
Pildes describes how law can destroy social capital by razing the physi-
cal spaces or social structures necessary for norms of cooperation and 
undermining reciprocity through legal interpretations dissonant with 
prevailing norms.59 
Recently, legal scholars have leapt into the fray to propose legal insti-
tutions and policies to reduce the alleged social capital-deflating effects 
of racial and ethnic diversity. In his recommendation for moderate ap-
proaches to diversity engineering, Peter Schuck observes, “Managing 
diversity wisely while also building, or at least maintaining, social capi-
tal is among the most compelling and difficult tasks facing all societies 
today.”60 Benjamin Barros proposes formal dispute resolution and in-
creased privatization of common resources in order to preserve both so-
cial capital and heterogeneity in common interest communities and natu-
56 See Ellickson, Order, supra note 22, at 270–72 (describing how the design of laws and 
legal institutions can support, or undermine, informal social control); Franzese, supra note 
19, at 561–62, 589 (stating that common interest community “planning patterns and modes 
of dispute resolution, with their emphasis on formalized mandates and broad enforcement 
mechanisms, create cultures of distrust . . . . [F]ormal legal institutions are called upon to 
accomplish what once was left (and is best left) to informal networks and social capital.”); 
see also Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 882–85 (ex-
amining effect of servitude and contract model on the prospects for community- and norm-
based resolution of conflicts).  
57 See Alexander, supra note 19, at 854; Johnson, supra note 19, at 191. 
58 See Alexander, supra note 19, at 861–63; Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273 (con-
tending that community organizations and other lending reforms can infuse social capital and 
reduce predatory lending). 
59 See Pildes, supra note 16, at 2063. 
60 See Schuck, supra note 8, at 84 (describing the superiority of positive incentives rather 
than coercive rules for managing diversity while building social capital). 
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ral resources management.61 James Kushner endorses higher density, 
mixed-use New Urbanist development to increase racial integration 
while reducing its negative effects on social capital.62 Other scholars 
contend that housing integration is the long-term solution to ensuring 
social capital in diverse communities.63 
The property scholarship posits social capital not only as an effect, 
but also a cause of well-functioning property institutions. Social capital 
enables devolution of property governance and public and private goods 
provision from law and government to resident groups, including home-
owners associations, neighborhood and block associations, and infor-
mally governed urban “commons.”64 Indeed, there appears to be little 
that social capital cannot accomplish. Property scholars contend that so-
cial capital produces interstitial governance, facilitates resident self-
governance, reduces conflicts in common interest communities, and 
conserves valuable natural resources.65 Bob Ellickson is one of the lead-
ing legal writers on the importance of social capital to efficient property 
institutions in small-scale residential settings. His work explores how 
block-level associations foster and capitalize upon social capital, tight-
knit communities employ social capital to create and enforce norms, and 
rental vouchers better maintain local social capital compared to mixed-
income housing.66 
61 See D. Benjamin Barros, Group Size, Heterogeneity, and Prosocial Behavior: Designing 
Legal Structures to Facilitate Cooperation in a Diverse Society, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
203, 215–17 (2008). 
62 See Kushner, supra note 8, at 599–601. 
63 Integration advocate Florence Wagman Roisman argues that increased residential inte-
gration will mitigate the harms described by Putnam and sustain civil society over the long-
term. See Roisman, supra note 8, at 519–20; see also Gerald E. Frug, The Geography of 
Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1077 (1996).  
64 See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83 (describing how support from so-
cial capital and “a coterminous informal social network helps an institution [such as a block-
level association] flourish”); Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (discussing the importance of 
social capital and how the regulation of common interest communities creates an environ-
ment where “social capital cannot be nurtured, let alone sustained, in settings of unbridled 
restrictiveness”); cf. Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 57, 89–93 (2011) (arguing that high social capital may justify greater devolu-
tion to residents but often some government support is still necessary).  
65 See e.g., Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1009; Franzese, supra note 
19, at 589–90; Kushner, supra note 8, at 600–01; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 182–84.  
66 See Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 109–10; Ellickson, New Institu-
tions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Ellickson, Order, supra note 22, at 270–72.  
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Perhaps the most influential and ardent proponent of social capital’s 
role in property institutions is Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel 
Prize. Ostrom’s path-breaking studies of successful community-
governed common pool resources showed that tragedies of the commons 
are not inevitable, or in game theory terms, that in prisoners’ dilemmas 
people can make credible commitments to cooperate rather than defect-
ing to inferior or last-best solutions.67 In several articles and a book, 
Ostrom heralded social capital as a “fundamental concept” for collec-
tively managed property: groups with sufficient ex ante social capital, 
and with collective design rules and repeated interactions that maintain 
social capital stock, can successfully self-govern property.68 
Turning to the policy arena, social capital is now a staple of land use 
planning, housing policy, and community and international develop-
ment. Social capital has rocketed from printed page to policy in large 
part due to its capacity to support a plethora of agendas, including pri-
vatization.69 The rhetorical force of social capital (its very sociability) 
and its legitimation of social concerns in an era of economic policymak-
ing drew liberals. For conservatives, social capital substitutes for gov-
ernment and, taken to the logical next step for some, counsels shrinking 
welfare—economic distress is due substantially to low social capital and 
best remedied with participation, not payment. 
Social capital is a growing feature of land use planning—a trend un-
recognized in the law scholarship and textbooks. Dozens of localities, 
often funded by community foundations, have completed “Social Capi-
tal Assessments” to quantitatively measure their community’s social 
67 See Ostrom, supra note 14, at 2–21, 26–28. 
68 See id.; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173 (noting that while there has been some “hoopla” 
about social capital, “[i]t is important that social capital be taken seriously and not allowed to 
be carried off as a fad”). She maintained that when “governments take over [community-
managed natural resources or schools] they destroy an immense stock of social capital in 
short order”—an especially troubling turn of events since, in Ostrom’s view, external or top-
down processes are not effective at building social capital. Id. at 182. 
69 Ostrom’s vision differs from traditional privatization models. However, the general in-
corporation of social capital in urban planning, land use, and property has capitalized on so-
cial capital as a justification for privatization. See Margit Mayer, The Onward Sweep of So-
cial Capital: Causes and Consequences for Understanding Cities, Communities, and Urban 
Movements, 27 Int’l J. Urb. & Regional Res. 108, 114–16 (2003). Indeed, Blair’s Fabian 
pamphlet cited social capital, stating, “[T]he Third Way . . . will build its prosperity on hu-
man and social capital.” Tony Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century 20 
(London Fabian Soc’y ed., 1998).  
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capital, at an average cost of $25,000 to $50,000.70 Comprehensive zon-
ing plans describe the community “stock” of social capital and report on 
how to enhance social capital through zoning, support for community 
groups and organizations, and growth controls.71 For example, the com-
prehensive plan of the city of Ludington, Michigan states that, “[e]vents 
and community groups are an excellent indicator of a community’s so-
cial capital,” while the Winston-Salem Comprehensive Plan “social cap-
ital recommendations” aim to “develop opportunities to increase com-
munity interaction” and “support community organizations involved in 
their planning and development efforts.”72 Social capital has featured in 
the Environmental Impact Statement process under the National Envi-
ronmental Protection Act.73 In at least two cases, residents have filed ob-
jections to highway and prison construction in their communities on the 
grounds of deleterious impacts to local social capital from the proposed 
sitings.74 Researchers Thomas Sander and Lew Feldstein, at Harvard 
University’s social capital Saguaro Seminar, are developing formal as-
sessments that governments can employ to evaluate the social capital 
impacts of proposed projects.75 
70 Many of these local social capital assessments were funded by community foundations 
and conducted by Putnam and his team, who used the data for their research. See Doug East-
erling, Promoting Community Leadership Among Community Foundations, 3 Found. Rev. 
81, 83 (2011), available at http://www.cftompkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Easter
ling-Promoting-CL-among-CFs-doc-2.pdf. 
71 As the Forsyth County comprehensive plan declares, “Social capital is important as a 
planning concept because, as Putnam argues, places that are not increasing their social capi-
tal will struggle to provide their residents with the types of economic and social opportuni-
ties that make a place a truly healthy and vibrant ‘community.’” See North Suburban Area 
Plan of Forsyth County and Winston-Salem 18 (Mar. 2006), http://www.cityofws.org/
Assets/CityOfWS/Documents/Planning/Publications/AreaPlans/NSAP.pdf; see also Vision 
2020 Comprehensive Plan Update City of Hamilton, Ohio 87 (Jan. 2008), http://
www.hamilton-city.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=494 (“Low-density 
development leads to a loss of cohesive communities, sense of place, and social capital.”).  
72 See City of Ludington, Michigan: A Comprehensive Plan 15 (May 2010), 
www.ludington.mi.us/docs/2009compupdatedraft050510.pdf; see also North Suburban Area 
Plan of Forsyth County and Winston-Salem, supra note 71, at 53. 
73 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
74 See Memorandum from New Hampshire Residents to Pamela J. Chandler, Chief, Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, Social Capital Impacts of the Proposed Federal Correctional Institution in 
Berlin, New Hampshire (May 5, 2006), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/
measurement/pdfs/berlinskimpact.pdf; Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements 
and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis 4 (1999), www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/
sandereisandsklessons.pdf. 
75 See, e.g., Lew Feldstein & Thomas Sander, Social Capital Impact Assessment, Saguaro 
Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Harvard Univ., http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/
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In cities, as funds have dwindled following federal devolution to the 
states and shrinking state disbursements to localities, communitarian-
style ventures that claim to produce social capital have proliferated (or 
their publicity has increased). Community gardens, gatherings, neigh-
borhood block grants, and other efforts to socialize city residents now 
ostensibly further social capital goals in an era of shrinking city funds 
for social services.76 Cities have subsidized social capital-enhancing 
New Urbanist developments with tax-increment financing, seemingly 
with mixed motives of promoting community sociability and responding 
to developer interests.77 Social capital theory also underlies recent exper-
iments in neighborhood self-governance. As the influence of social capi-
tal and participatory empowerment burgeoned in the 1990s, Portland de-
volved certain land use responsibilities to neighborhood associations, 
and Los Angeles created neighborhood councils to hear land use and 
zoning requests and manage small funds for neighborhood improve-
ment.78 The most notable of these neighborhood democracy reforms is 
the now-defunct Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program 
(“NRP”), established by the state legislature in 1990, which devolved 
local planning and fiscal funding to neighborhoods.79 
Social capital has also permeated federal housing policy. The federal 
government justifies homeownership subsidies, such as the home mort-
gage interest deduction, in part on its alleged effect of promoting social 
capital in local communities.80 The Hope VI low-income housing pro-
gram administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (“HUD”) explicitly incorporates social capital. Federal guide-
 
ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/saguaro/pdfs/measurement/
skimpactassessment.pdf (last visted Apr. 9, 2013).  
76 Nonprofits, such as the Urban Affairs Association, have devoted conferences to social 
capital and the social reconstruction of the city and major community foundations have made 
social capital the centerpiece of their work. See DeFilippis, supra note 27, at 788 (describing 
social capital investment by community foundations). 
77 Greg LeRoy, TIF, Greenfields, and Sprawl: How an Incentive Created to Alleviate 
Slums Has Come to Subsidize Upscale Malls and New Urbanist Developments, 2 Plan. & 
Envtl. L. 3, 8–10 (2008), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/
pdf/apa.pdf. 
78 See Matt Leighninger, The Promise and Challenge of Neighborhood Democracy 7–8 
(2008). 
79 See infra Section III.A. 
80 See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 Col-
um. L. Rev. 890, 896–97, 903–05 (2011) (finding to the contrary that differences between 
homeowners and tenants are modest). 
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lines for Hope VI public housing developments emphasize New Urban-
ist features claimed to enhance social interaction and build social capital, 
as well as to increase convenience and quality of life for residents.81 
HUD, particularly under former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, has al-
so advocated the social capital-related theory of “defensible space” for 
low-income housing. Defensible space theory claims to reduce crime by 
designing buildings to increase sense of community, neighbor interac-
tion, and resident surveillance through features such as street-facing 
windows, single-family design, and cul-de-sacs.82 In some cases, defen-
sible space concerns have led cities to close residential streets in order to 
build community social capital and reduce disorder—a stark visual of 
social capital’s role in closing off property.83 
B. Social Science Evidence: The Case for Social Capital 
The prevailing narrative among legal scholars is that social capital 
produces economic growth and other beneficial community outcomes, 
promotes the productive and peaceable utilization of property, and ena-
bles self-governance structures that overcome free rider problems (the 
problem of free-riding on social capital is left unresolved).84 Accounts 
81 See Thomas H. Sander, Social Capital and New Urbanism: Leading a Civic Horse to 
Water?, 91 Nat’l Civic Rev. 213, 215 n.11, 216 (2002) (describing connection between so-
cial capital and New Urbanism and the increasing incorporation of New Urbanist principles 
into HUD low-income housing projects). See generally Principles for Inner City Neighbor-
hood Design, A Collaboration of the Congress for New Urbanism and the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/principles.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).  
82 See Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design 1–15, 
50, 61 (1972) (describing theory and design features); Blair Kamin, Building a Sense of Se-
curity, Chi. Trib., June 21, 1995, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-
06-21/news/9506210179_1_defensible-space-public-housing-chicago-housing-authority (de-
scribing HUD backing of defensible space theory). 
83 See, e.g., Oscar Newman, Defensible Space, 93 Shelterforce 8, 8 (1997), available at 
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/93/defense.html (describing defensible space initiative in a 
Dayton, Ohio neighborhood that closed off thirty-five streets and twenty-five alleys).  
84 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Con-
duct, and the Financial Crisis, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 641, 679 (2011) [hereinafter 
Brescia, Cost] (concluding that communities with high social capital are “better off”); see 
also Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273 (“The relative presence or strength of social capital 
can mean the difference between a well-functioning society and one that is riddled by cor-
ruption, crime, low levels of civic participation and high levels of mistrust of neighbors, civ-
ic institutions, and elected officials.”); Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 
1008–09 (describing social capital and the importance of “bonding social capital” at the 
block level); Franzese, supra note 19, at 567–69. 
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vary, or are silent, on whether social capital changes preferences or 
merely mobilizes pre-existing preferences—but no matter, at the end of 
the day social capital does something good for communities and the na-
tion. Before turning to my account of the dark side of residential social 
capital, it is worth examining these assumptions in light of social science 
evidence and theory. 
In Bowling Alone, Putnam makes a series of bold claims about the 
value of social capital to communities: community-level social capital 
enhances local economic growth, educational outcomes, child welfare, 
health, and crime control.85 However, he offers only state-level data with 
limited controls.86 In Putnam’s later research on U.S. communities, these 
extravagant claims are no longer present.87 Moreover, even at the state 
level, researchers reanalyzing Putnam’s data with more rigorous controls 
for economic inequality, percent black population, region, and time-
lagged variables found that the relationship between state-level social 
capital scores and many outcomes lost significance altogether.88 Locally, 
there is little evidence that social capital improves housing outcomes or 
community development, with some research suggesting that higher so-
cial capital in a building or block may displace rather than reduce crime 
or other social ills.89 The correlation of social capital with crime reduc-
tion has been established only in urban neighborhoods, using a different 
construct of collective efficacy, pioneered by Robert Sampson, that fo-
85 See Putnam, supra note 2. Ben Fine notes: “Social capital offers the golden opportunity 
of improving the status quo without challenging it. Everything from educational outcomes 
through crime prevention to better psychological health can be improved if neighbours and 
communities would only pull together and trust and interact with one another.” Ben Fine, 
Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly 4 (2010).  
86 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 415–24 (describing sources and methods used in book). 
87 This finding is also subject to a measurement effect where subjects who answer ques-
tions about community participation positively are then more likely to report satisfaction and 
happiness due to consistency drives and cuing. 
88 See Alejandro Portes & Erik Vickstrom, Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion, 37 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 461, 468 (2011). 
89 Temkin and Rohe’s study of urban neighborhood social capital concluded that volun-
teering and organizational participation did not affect neighborhood stability. Kenneth Tem-
kin & William M. Rohe, Social Capital and Neighborhood Stability: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 9 Housing Pol’y Debate 61, 84–85 (1998); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce 
Sacerdote, The Social Consequences of Housing, 9 J. Housing Econ. 1, 17–22 (2000); Susan 
Saegert et al., Social Capital and Crime in New York City’s Low-Income Housing, 13 Hous-
ing Pol’y Debate 189, 219 (2002) (noting that while there was crime reduction in the housing 
unit, crime might have been displaced to other blocks).  
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cuses on norms of social regulation within communities.90 There is no 
evidence that community social capital in the United States increases lo-
cal economic growth, and the evidence of positive effects on health is 
inconsistent.91 Most concerning, recent research by Alejandro Portes and 
Erik Vickstrom calls into question the validity of Putnam’s social capital 
measure and raises a serious question of whether social capital scores 
reflect an omitted variable. Portes and Vickstrom find that historical pat-
terns of slavery and Scandinavian immigration offer a better explanation 
for social capital scores—a pattern they note cannot be undone by “ex-
horting citizens to become more participatory.”92 
Research in political science, economics, and psychology suggests 
other stumbling blocks for social capital. First, as J. Eric Oliver ob-
serves, it is too simplistic to assume that more social or civic participa-
tion equals more democracy or other benefits because these outcomes 
depend on structural and political factors.93 One of those factors, as Mor-
ris Fiorina notes in his critique of social capital, is whether the civically 
engaged group or groups represents the interests and values of the com-
munity or of larger society.94 He argues that communities may be better 
off with little civic engagement or robust engagement by multiple inter-
est groups, but that the middle ground of civic engagement often repre-
sents capture by insular minority interests.95 In addition, gains to certain 
aspects of social capital often come at the expense of other aspects of 
social capital or other values. In Democracy in Suburbia, Oliver argues 
that suburbanization has partially demobilized citizens from local poli-
tics.96 Class and background homogeneity in the suburbs lessens politi-
cal and social conflict and reduces the need for political engagement, a 
90 See Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Neighborhood 
Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 Criminolo-
gy 517, 518 (2001). 
91 See DeFilippis, supra note 27, at 798 (criticizing social capital for failing to create eco-
nomic development); Megan Perry et al., Social Capital and Health Care Experiences 
Among Low-Income Individuals, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 330, 330–35 (2008) (reporting 
mixed findings).  
92 Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 468–69.  
93 See J. Eric Oliver, Democracy in Suburbia 190 (2001).  
94 See Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in Civic En-
gagement in American Democracy 395, 403 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 
1999). 
95 See id. at 418.  
96 See Oliver, supra note 93, at 188. 
    
2013] The Dark Side of Town 833 
harm which in his view outweighs the benefits of small community size 
to social capital.97 
Second, economic theory suggests some limitations to social capital. 
Free-riding and displacement limit the amount of welfare enhancement 
from social capital, while the availability of substitutes for social capital 
undermines its claimed primacy to modern life. In their economic cri-
tique of social capital, Steven Durlauf and Marcel Fafchamps describe 
these impediments.98 Displacement occurs when social capital redistrib-
utes a fixed supply of goods rather than creates wealth.99 For example, if 
a local budget is limited and fixed, neighborhood social capital that ena-
bles a neighborhood to organize to demand better trash pick-up services 
may result in reductions in the quality and promptness of trash pick-up 
in other neighborhoods. In some cases, redistribution can be desirable 
for equitable or historical reasons, but in other cases, it may be socially 
undesirable or reflect rent-seeking. Free-riding on social capital can also 
limit the incentives for its production and its net efficacy to society.100 
Sheila Foster describes this problem in her discussion of free-riding as 
an impediment to resident collective action in the urban commons.101 
Perhaps most importantly, the availability of substitutes calls into ques-
tion the necessity of abundant social capital. Communities with lower 
social capital can adopt alternatives such as taxation, private provision 
of goods (for example, hiring private security or other services), local 
government institutions, laws, and non-profit organizations to achieve 
the outcomes ascribed to social capital.102 
Last, drawing on psychology research, I contend that in some instanc-
es social capital may create second-order effects where the process of 
collective action, which may be socially positive in the first instance, 
subsequently creates negative norms and behaviors. Indeed, some of 
what we perceive as collective action “failure” may occur, and legal and 
market substitutes may arise, because of the risk of negative spillovers 
from the social capital and in-group formation necessary to support in-
formal collective action. The local social capital described by Putnam 
97 See id. 
98 See Steven N. Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, Social Capital 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10485, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10485.pdf.  
99 See id. at 15. 
100 See id. at 24. 
101 See Foster, supra note 64, at 71–72. 
102 See Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 98, at 11, 13. 
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tracks the social psychological concept of self-preferencing in-groups. 
In-groups are an inevitable facet of social life, but strengthening in-
groups, empowering them with decision-making authority over interests 
beyond the group, and failing to supply laws or norms to constrain their 
actions can have substantial negative effects. In-groups typically prefer-
ence the interests of their group and adopt beliefs that support their 
group and further its social position.103 In doing so, members of in-
groups, particularly tight-knit or high-status groups, frequently develop 
negative views of or behaviors toward members of other groups.104 
Work by Irving Janis on “group think” shows how intense in-group 
pressures contract independent moral judgment and dissenting action.105 
There is also a large body of evidence, considered by Cass Sunstein in 
the legal scholarship, on how deliberating (here collectively cooperat-
ing) groups go to extremes.106 The psychological tendency to reduce dis-
sonance between beliefs and actions by changing beliefs to support be-
havior provides another explanation for intensification of belief through 
the process of collective action.107 The fact that people have multiple in-
group affiliations may mitigate these harms but does not eliminate them, 
particularly when a person identifies strongly with one or a small num-
ber of in-groups.108 
In conclusion, the strong form of social capital—Putnam’s expansive 
social capital measure and exuberant outcomes claims—has limited 
utility. It is under-specified, near limitless, the outcomes evidence is 
weak, and recent reanalysis suggests that social capital scores reflect 
omitted variables and historical determinants.109 To the extent that legal 
commentators mean to adopt Putnam’s capacious social capital construct 
as scientifically established and credit its array of claimed outcomes, 
their case is weak for the reasons described above. However, much of 
the legal literature contemplates a more modest iteration of social capi-
tal, upon which this Article focuses: the concerted effect of social net-
103 See Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 575, 576 (2002) (re-
viewing literature on in-group bias). 
104 See id. at 585. 
105 See Janis, supra note 33, at 10–13, 197–98. 
106 See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 5–7, 14–16, 36–37, 41–42.  
107 See Festinger, supra note 33, at 12–24, 261–62. 
108 See Hewstone et al., supra note 103, at 591–93. 
109 See Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 470–77; Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social 
Capital?, 40 J. Econ. Literature 139, 140 (2002) (writing that Putnam “comes close to equat-
ing social capital with good outcomes”). See generally Section I.B. 
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works, in-group trust, and tastes for participation on collective action 
within moderately connected or tight-knit groups.110 While not eliminat-
ing capaciousness and tautology, this construct does at least capture an 
intuitive aspect of social life and one that is supported in several respects 
by social psychology research.111 We need not dismiss this iteration of 
social capital, but we should be skeptical of its ability to sustain property 
institutions and wary of its potential harms. 
II. THE DARK SIDE OF RESIDENTIAL SOCIAL CAPITAL
The enthusiasm for social capital in property law has obscured social 
capital’s capacity to effectuate illiberal exclusion and create and advance 
factions contrary to the public interest. Notably, social capital is at the 
heart of Madison’s factions, citizen groups that advance interests contra-
ry to the public good, described in Federalist 10, as well as factions’ 
economic cousins, cartels.112 Madison defined factions as “a number of 
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of in-
terest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and ag-
gregate interests of the community.”113 In a similar vein, Adam Smith 
observed in The Wealth of Nations that networks and trust can create 
monopolization and a group whose “interest is . . . directly opposite to 
that of the great body of the people.”114 Madison perceived factions in 
the political sense of dominant interest group capture of the political 
process and thus was less concerned with minority factions (wrongly, as 
110 See, e.g., supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
111 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 33, at 199–201. Notably, informal and quasi-formal forms of 
social interaction and participation, often occurring in small groups and private interactions, 
may have powerful effects not studied or successfully captured by the quantitative research 
described in this Section.  
112 See The Federalist No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell 2003). But see Peter 
H. Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance 218–22 (2000) (contend-
ing that factions are essential to a vibrant polity and that the power of diffuse interests, dif-
ferent forms of political resources, and the political system’s increasing resistance to faction-
al domination reduce the magnitude of danger from factions). 
113 See The Federalist No. 10, supra note 112, at 51. This definition focuses on negative 
outcomes, as well as negative intentions, and therefore parallels the tendencies toward tau-
tology in the social capital construct. 
114 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 307 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1993) (1776). 
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scholars of interest group politics have pointed out).115 As the residential 
context illustrates, factions operate through informal action and coordi-
nation as well as political lobbying, and both minority and majority fac-
tions can cause harm. 
In considering solutions to the problem of factions, Madison observed 
that “[l]iberty is to faction, what air is to fire.”116 In this instance, Robert 
Putnam and the social capitalists may have the better of Madison. It is 
not liberty but networks and participation that incite and explode the 
power of factions, which are, at least at the outset, informal groups with 
all of the collective action barriers that face self-organizing groups. Re-
call the constituent elements of social capital: cohesive groups and net-
works, reciprocity, tastes for participation, civic engagement, and trust. 
Social ties spread information necessary for planning concerted action, 
reinforce dominant norms, and, coupled with reciprocity, recruit partici-
pants who might otherwise object. Madison himself described what we 
now refer to as diffusion in local social networks: the problem of pas-
sions spreading to create a majority faction.117 Trust, a central element of 
social capital, may be particularly important when the action contem-
plated is collusive, illegal, or otherwise socially objectionable.118 Group 
members must trust others in the relevant community not to defect or re-
port them to authorities. Tastes for participation predict greater inclina-
tion and competence at organizing collective action. And social cohesion 
and group identity provide powerful in-kind benefits that counteract the 
costs of collective action.119 
In residential communities, collective activity by resident factions and 
cartels to constrain housing supply or entrance is facilitated by the same 
cohesive networks, tastes for participation, experience with organiza-
115 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 726–27, 
742, 745 (1985). 
116 The Federalist No. 10, supra note 112, at 51. 
117 Cf. id. at 57–58 (stating that a large republic will prevent factions’ passions from 
spreading to become a majority). Madison also argued that it is easier for small numbers of 
individuals to work together. Id. at 54–55, 57.  
118 As Margaret Levi observes, “[Neighborhoods] promote trust of those you know and 
distrust of those you do not, those not in the neighborhood or outside the networks.” Marga-
ret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democ-
racy Work, 24 Pol. & Soc’y 45, 51 (1996). 
119 See Roger Waldinger, The ‘Other Side’ of Embeddedness: A Case-Study of the Inter-
play of Economy and Ethnicity, 18 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 555, 557 (1995). 
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tions, and in-group trust attributed to positive social capital.120 Indeed, 
bonding social capital, with its elements of group cohesion and insulari-
ty, reciprocity, and collective engagement, is perhaps uniquely well-
suited to producing exclusion—likely more so than democracy or other 
claimed benefits. This may explain why social capital features so promi-
nently in Ostrom’s research on open-access natural resource commons 
where preserving the resource often necessitates exclusion of entrants or 
uses.121 In the residential context, there is a robust correlation between 
high social capital and racial exclusion, though the studies to date do not 
establish causation.122 Qualitative studies of bonding capital, often in the 
context of ethnic control of industries, also provide some empirical sup-
port for the tendency of cohesive social capital to confer gains to in-
groups at the expense of closing markets.123 In general, the evidence for 
social capital’s role in factions and exclusion is difficult to assess quanti-
tatively through standard outcomes measures: If high social capital pro-
duces collusive behavior, it may improve some local and state indica-
tors, but impose harms on society and the national economy that are 
difficult to link causally. 
In addition to its capacity to effectuate factions, social capital may al-
so create or intensify factions by bonding together groups that then 
adopt group-preferencing beliefs and agendas. The type of collective ac-
tion envisioned by social capitalists—intensive, reiterative, and in pur-
suit of a common goal—may intensify preferences by escalating group 
identity and in-group dynamics and increasing the cost of dissent. As 
previously discussed, a large body of evidence in social psychology 
supports these effects: Research illustrates the vulnerability of groups to 
“group think,” the effect of dense social networks on conformity, and 
the tendency toward cognitive dissonance where people change beliefs 
to make them consonant with their actions.124 Moreover, some research 
suggests that group bias tracks social position and may create a greater 
propensity for these effects among high-status groups.125 
120 Group collusion to restrain supply is problematic when the property in question has 
demand beyond the group and its restraint is socially harmful, or when the internal distribu-
tion of property is inegalitarian. 
121 See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173–79, 182–84. 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
123 See Portes, supra note 25, at 15. 
124 See Festinger, supra note 33, at 12–24; Janis, supra note 33, at 10–13, 197. 
125 High-status groups, or factions, tend to show more bias apart from any effect of wealth 
or resources, and there is some evidence to suggest that this effect is more pronounced when 
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Endeavoring to raise social capital in a town, neighborhood, or block 
is more likely to coalesce or strengthen factional subgroups than to fur-
ther the interests of the broader residential or social collective. The cost 
of creating and maintaining social capital is lower in small and homoge-
nous groups, all else constant. As a result, social capital disproportion-
ately advances factions, which tend to be discrete and homogenous 
groups, compared to large groups and more diverse communities of in-
terest. The strong interests entailed in factions also dovetail with social 
capital. Because social capital accumulation requires significant invest-
ment and effort by group members, it is most likely to effectuate collec-
tive action where participants have strong motivations and will capture a 
high proportion of the benefits, as is often the case with bad acts as well 
as private goods. In addition, in developed economies, social networks 
and informal institutions may be most effective at providing goods that 
cannot be supplied at a low-cost or at all from the market or government. 
It is possible that social capital’s dark side is so substantial in part be-
cause legal and market substitutes are comparatively less available for 
bad acts, illiberalism, and illegal activity (though not unavailable as evi-
denced by laws such as exclusionary zoning and racially restrictive cov-
enants). 
Madison was convinced one could not control the causes of factions. 
In theory, however, reducing the social capital in an area or group can 
address the mediator of public bads from factions (social capital partially 
mediates the relationship between “passions” and faction effects). Per-
haps Madison’s views of the protective power of diverse interests and 
the increased costs of organizing factions in large republics track the 
idea of breaking up social capital. However, Madison neglected substi-
tutes for social capital. Factions in small geographic areas, such as 
neighborhoods or small towns, which have the advantage of close prox-
imity and social ties, may employ social capital, whereas factions at a 
larger scale often rely more heavily on the substitutes of economic and 
political capital. This lends support to Carol Rose’s vigorous refutation 
of Madison’s arguments about the particular susceptibility of local gov-
ernments to faction.126 It also suggests a partial explanation for Madi-
 
the groups perceive their status differential narrowing or a threat to group status. See Hew-
stone et al., supra note 103, at 585.  
126 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 Yale L.J. 1121, 1132–34 
(1996) (reviewing William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 
(1995)). 
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son’s concern about factions in small geographic areas, as well as the te-
nacious modern-day suspicion of local government corruption. Perhaps, 
as intrinsically social beings, social capital-fueled actions at the local 
level are not more potent but rather more salient, evocative, and squarely 
within our experience, than political lobbying, trade associations, and 
other substitutes that make factions effective at larger scales. Indeed, it 
may be that Madison suffered from availability bias. 
Concededly, the relationship between social capital and factions is 
imprecise, and the dark side of social capital is no more delimited than 
its positive aspect. Social capital does not create a particular interest, in 
the way we typically conceive of factions. I employ factions as a con-
ceptual umbrella, rather than a perfect analog, for the negative externali-
ties of social capital. The dark side of social capital and its role in fac-
tions also suffers unavoidably from the same capaciousness and 
tendency toward tautology that plagues the social capital construct.127 I 
do not resist these critiques or their implications. My contention is that, 
taking the social capital construct as I find it, local social capital elicits 
both socially positive collective action and factional collective action 
desirable and sometimes efficient within the group, but harmful to the 
broader community. If social capital ultimately proves too encompassing 
to usefully describe positive or negative local effects, then it should be 
abandoned in property discourse. 
Property scholars have been neglectful of, but not blind to, the dark 
side of social capital.128 The property scholarship notes in passing nega-
tive uses of social capital, but does not address the magnitude or impli-
cations of social capital’s dark side.129 Scholars have, however, raised 
related concerns about illiberalism in commons situations. Hanoch Da-
gan and Michael Heller focus on constraints on exit and voice as threats 
127 Of course, there are some limits to my account and the social capital construct, such as 
situations where distrust or a lack of civic orientation within the group fuels its collective 
action.  
128 Outside of property law, Frank Cross endorses the value of the trust component of so-
cial capital to transactional law, but recognizes the dark side of trust and notes the problems 
of ethnic control of trade and discrimination from strong affective trust. See Frank B. Cross, 
Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1532–43 (2005). 
129 See Franzese, supra note 19, at 568; cf. Foster, supra note 19, at 563 (exploring social 
capital’s benefits for urban communities but observing that “the goal of providing ‘bridging’ 
capital may be undermined by social prejudices and the exclusionary effects of social net-
works in racially and economically homogenous neighborhoods”).  
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to a liberal commons.130 Carol Rose argues for at least a minimal frame-
work of law to address concerns of hierarchical, non-egalitarian, and 
sexist practices in Ostrom’s commons.131 Other perspectives embrace 
markets and implicitly minimize the role of self-governance, such as 
work by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith on information costs and 
standardized property forms.132 
In the social science literature, amid droves of papers lauding social 
capital, a smaller number have explored social capital’s dark side.133 In 
her work on community-managed natural resources, Ostrom acknowl-
edges and describes the dark side of social capital but does not grapple 
with whether or when this dark side should limit her proposals for self-
governance of natural resource commons.134 Putnam readily concedes 
that bonding capital can be exclusive, but claims two intrinsic safe-
guards. First, he contends that associational participation and civic en-
gagement promote tolerance, and notes that social capital scores posi-
tively correlate with tolerance.135 In addition to the reliability issues with 
self-report, the fact that individuals living in segregated communities 
and likely participating in homogenous groups and organizations report 
more tolerance may prove little. At the state level, if, as Portes and 
Vickstrom maintain, low state social capital scores reflect historic pat-
terns of slavery, it is not surprising that more tolerant states report higher 
social capital.136 Second, Putnam maintains that bridging ties constrain 
130 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 Yale L.J. 549, 567–
68, 590–91 (2001). 
131 See Rose, supra note 29, at 33, 44. 
132 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8–9 (2000). 
133 See Jan W. van Deth & Sonja Zmerli, Introduction: Civicness, Equality, and Democra-
cy—A “Dark Side” of Social Capital?, 53 Am. Behav. Scientist 631, 632–38 (2010) (review-
ing social science literature on dark sides of social capital and introducing contributions to a 
recent symposium on social capital’s detrimental political effects); see also Fine, supra note 
85, at 5 (noting that among social scientists the critics of social capital are “heavily out-
weighed”). The social science accounts of social capital’s dark side often focus on extreme 
examples of mafia activity, gangs, genocidal atrocities, and insular, religious solidarity. See 
Levi, supra note 118, at 52 (describing how the mafia uses bridging ties within vertical rela-
tionships for organized crime); Portes, supra note 25, at 18 (describing how negative social 
capital, or embeddedness in social structures, fuels “[m]afia families, prostitution and gam-
bling rings, and youth gangs”); Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22 (describing how negative so-
cial capital enabled the Timothy McVeigh bombing, urban gangs, and the Ku Klux Klan). 
134 See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 21, at 176–77.  
135 Putnam, supra note 2, at 355–56. 
136 See Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 467–69. 
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illiberal effects by connecting geographically and socially distant indi-
viduals, facilitating diffusion of information and ideas, and generating 
broader identities.137 Yet, we have had difficulty engineering the types of 
bridging ties that trump bonding capital, promote inclusion and toler-
ance, connect disadvantaged people to opportunities, and create rather 
than redistribute wealth.138 Bridging capital often has a limited radius, 
necessitating a plethora of bridging ties to ensure broader solidarity (for 
example, labor unions bridged across race but not income). And once 
achieved, bridging ties and capital may morph into bonding capital. 
While bridging capital has some value to residential property, it is 
doubtful that it can fully remedy the negative externalities of local bond-
ing capital. 
My account challenges the legal scholarship’s depiction of social cap-
ital as a positive good, and augments the social science literature with a 
view of the pervasive, sometimes quotidian nature of social capital’s 
dark side in residential property. The enthusiasm for promoting residen-
tial social capital has not confronted the disquieting reality of seemingly 
abundant negative social capital in localities—and the potential for so-
cial capital engineering, if effective, to exacerbate such harms.139 Social 
capital often functions as a norm-neutral infrastructure that effectuates 
motivations, which include prejudice, risk-aversion, and rent-seeking. 
When the social capital that legal scholars and policymakers are attempt-
ing to build is mere cohesion, without a strong normative valence toward 
public interest values, liberalism, altruism, or positive social regulation, 
there is little reason to assume that such ventures will be welfare-
enhancing or egalitarian. This is not to claim that legal proposals or ini-
tiatives to promote social capital are solely responsible for these ills, 
which derive from powerful norms and financial incentives. Rather, it is 
to elucidate, in the context of anemic residential norms regarding extra-
local obligations to the public good, the problem with proposals to pro-
mote social capital while diminishing the role of law. 
137 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 23; Wilfred Dolfsma & Charlie Dannreuther, Subjects and 
Boundaries: Contesting Social Capital-Based Policies, 37 J. Econ. Issues 405, 407–10 
(2003).  
138 See, e.g., Madeleine Leonard, Bonding and Bridging Social Capital: Reflections from 
Belfast, 38 Soc. 927, 941 (2004). 
139 But see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1047, 1098–100 
(2008) (referring to reducing investment stake risk through proposed homeownership form, 
which splits consumption and use interests between different owners, might lessen both ben-
eficial forms of “collective control” and negative forms such as exclusion). 
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Interestingly, my analysis of sundown towns and exclusionary sub-
urbs also suggests that bonding social capital can operate effectively and 
negatively, if at a higher cost, beyond the scale of small groups. Bob El-
lickson has argued that bonding social capital functions effectively only 
in small-scale settings, such as a block or median size homeowners as-
sociation.140 In his view, lawmakers should be more concerned about po-
licing at the larger scales of neighborhoods and localities, where social 
capital formation is limited.141 The case studies in this Article suggest 
that while scale matters, strong interests and bridging ties can overcome 
the higher transaction costs of social capital development and deploy-
ment at the scales of neighborhoods and towns. A critical mass of highly 
motivated actors appears quite capable of recruiting like-minded others 
through bridging ties, developing cohesive groups and intra-group 
norms, and engaging in coordinated behavior that disadvantages outsid-
ers or out-groups. 
In the balance of this Part, I consider the alleged deficit of social capi-
tal and proposals to increase residential social capital through the lenses 
of residential segregation and land cartels. My examples are retrospec-
tive accounts intended to illustrate social capital’s role in residential fac-
tions and exclusion, not prospective hypothesis-testing or conclusive 
empirical proof. My examination of the dark side of social capital in res-
idential property raises questions of whether law should attempt to af-
firmatively weaken residential social bonds, perhaps with measures such 
as incentives for mobility or heavy subsidies for economic integration. I 
mainly save these questions for future work. In Part V, however, I do 
suggest that property institutions with greater reliance on markets and 
laws, among other alternatives, may foster more inclusive forms of soli-
darity than property gemeinschafts and informal collectives. 
A. Sundown Towns: Social Capital, Racial Segregation, and Bad Norm 
Lock-In 
In the early to mid-twentieth century, “sundown towns” across the 
United States evicted black residents and visitors through threats, labor 
140 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Puzzle of the Optimal Social Composition of Neighbor-
hoods, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace 
Oates 199, 204–06 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) [hereinafter Ellickson, Social Composi-
tion].  
141 I thank Bob Ellickson for his discussion with me of his views on this point. 
    
2013] The Dark Side of Town 843 
market exclusion, violence, and signs advising blacks, “Don’t Let the 
Sun Go Down on You in [town name].”142 These towns illustrate a larger 
national phenomenon—in an era Putnam claims as rich in social capital, 
white residents worked together zealously to maintain racial homogenei-
ty. Contemporary racial segregation and urban poverty are rooted in part 
in this national history of racial purging, which appears to have been ef-
fectuated through considerable social capital.143 
In sundown towns, collective action was embedded in dense networks 
of social ties that spread information about riots, pledges, mob violence, 
and other coordinated action and channeled anti-black norms. Commu-
nity cohesion helped to reward participants with social standing and 
group identity—benefits in addition to any implicit compensation they 
derived from racist acts. Groups of residents or business owners gath-
ered to sign pledges not to employ blacks or to allow them to live in the 
area.144 Residents converged on blacks to warn them to leave town.145 
Civic engagement and political participation produced sundown ordi-
nances and laws requiring resident approval before subsidized housing 
could be built.146 Social network linkages to local realtors, bankers, gro-
cery store and gas station owners, and town officials meant that blacks 
142 See James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism 3–
4, 36–37, 99–101 (2005). Loewen estimates that at least 3000 and as many as 15,000 inde-
pendent towns “went sundown” between 1890 and 1930, and several thousand sundown 
suburbs formed between 1900 and 1968. See id. at 79–80. Historians have critiqued Loe-
wen’s research for its lack of attention to black agency, its erratic substantiation, and its 
claims about the northern migration. See Luther James Adams, Sundown Towns: A Hidden 
Dimension of American Racism, 93 J. Am. Hist. 601, 602 (2006) (book review) (praising 
Loewen’s massive and well-documented study but critiquing the limited attention to the 
black experience); Kenneth Joel Zogry, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American 
Racism by James W. Loewen, 29 Pub. Historian 105, 106–07 (2007) (critiquing inadequate 
fact documentation and lack of attention to black reactions and agency). But no historian has 
disputed the fact of sundown towns. Zogry, supra, at 105 (“There is no question that the 
premise of Sundown Towns is correct.”). 
143 Intrinsic satisfaction with racist acts no doubt also helped overcome collective actions 
and convince perpetrators to pay the costs of action and face the threat, concededly not large 
in most areas, of arrest or prosecution. See Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Cri-
sis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 209–50 (1996). Some towns still flaunted sun-
down signs as of 1990, and today some small Southern towns display signs of black mules at 
their town lines. See Loewen, supra note 142, at 380.  
144 See Loewen, supra note 142, at 249; see also Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Color 
Line: An Account of Negro Citizenship in the American Democracy 120, 130 (1908). 
145 As the Illinois State Register recorded in 1908, “A Negro is an unwelcome visitor and 
is soon informed he must not remain in the town.” Loewen, supra note 142, at 227. 
146 See id. at 253. 
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could be excluded not only from jobs, but also from necessities of daily 
living.147 Intergenerational closure, a key aspect in some iterations of so-
cial capital, was employed by white parents to harass black children ei-
ther directly or through their children.148 And bridging ties reduced the 
costs of exclusion by carrying news about town reputations that deterred 
black entry and spread information about the trend of local racial purg-
ing—many towns “went sundown” after residents learned about nearby 
sundown towns. 
Participation in community organizations, a central constituent of so-
cial capital, also facilitated racial exclusion—historically, an important 
purpose of neighborhood clubs and associations was racial exclusion.149 
Thomas Sugrue’s history of Detroit describes how neighborhood associ-
ations that “saw their purpose as upholding the values of self-
government and participatory democracy” organized to keep blacks 
from moving into their neighborhoods in order to protect property values 
and the “character” of their communities.150 For example, in one Detroit 
West Side neighborhood, over six hundred residents held an emergency 
meeting to form a neighborhood association in response to a black fami-
ly moving into the area.151 The National Association of Community As-
sociations organized “to keep the colored race from encroaching on the 
rights of the property owners by buying into the neighborhood.”152 “Citi-
zen committees” coordinated to drive out blacks and “Farmers’ Com-
mercial Clubs” sought to replace black residents with white farmers.153 
Following Shelley v. Kraemer, neighborhood and civic associations 
across the country organized to flout the decision through tactics ranging 
from harassment to abuse of nonconforming use ordinances.154 
In addition to effectuating racial purging, solidaristic social capital 
likely intensified racist preferences and locked in bad norms. Recall that 
147 See id. at 234, 259–62. 
148 See id. at 265–66. 
149 For example, one of the earliest razings of a Chinese neighborhood occurred in 1885 
when 150 miners and railroad workers, led by the Knights of Labor, attacked hundreds of 
Chinese-American miners, drove them out of town, and then burned their homes. See id. at 
50–51. 
150 See Sugrue, supra note 143, at 211. 
151 Id. at 214. 
152 Id. at 219. 
153 Loewen, supra note 142, at 84, 241–42. 
154 For example, the Federated Property Owners homeowners association “called for a 
citywide network” to monitor, harass, and manipulate prices. See Sugrue, supra note 143, at 
221. 
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groups tightly bound together with social capital are likely to develop 
attitudes and pursue actions that preference their own group.155 For these 
reasons, anti-social action may spiral over time—indeed, sundown 
towns may be a vigilante version of how deliberating groups go to ex-
tremes.156 On the omission side of preference construction and escala-
tion, cohesive social capital tends to lock in bad norms and preferences 
that hinder or foreclose change. Dense ties mean that dissent would 
cause friction between close-knit community members and threaten so-
cial estrangement.157 Social ties and the rapid spread of information 
through local networks also enable groups to punish “defectors,” in the 
case of sundown towns by retaliating against whites who hired, housed, 
or befriended blacks.158 
Interestingly, the most recent influence of social capital on residential 
racial segregation is normative. Putnam’s highly publicized 2007 social 
capital research claims (contrary to the weight of the evidence on this 
question) that residential racial diversity dramatically lowers social capi-
tal.159 These claims have seeped into public discourse and beliefs. Social 
capital theory also maintains, with limited evidence, that community 
flourishing and economic success rely on residential behaviors that 
Americans believe are intrinsically uncharacteristic of blacks and unlike-
ly to occur in racially integrated or otherwise heterogeneous communi-
ties. Residential racial beliefs link blacks and integrated neighborhoods 
155 See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
156 See Janis, supra note 33, at 12–13; see also Sunstein, supra note 33, at 3–7.  
157 Interviews and oral histories suggest that some residents disagreed with such actions (or 
at least claimed to in hindsight) but did not speak up from fear of retaliation. See Loewen, 
supra note 142, at 232.  
158 See id. at 244, 271. 
159 See Putnam, supra note 1. A line of subsequent studies using more robust controls and 
sophisticated analytical techniques finds that the effect of neighborhood diversity on social 
capital claimed by Putnam is small and contingent on contextual factors like inequality and 
segregation. See Edward Fieldhouse & David Cutts, Does Diversity Damage Social Capital? 
A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the US and Britain, 
43 Canadian J. Pol. Sci. 289, 307 (2010) (“[A] very large proportion of [the effect of diversi-
ty on neighborhood norms] is attributable to [individual and neighborhood] characteris-
tics . . . .”); Natalia Letki, Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in 
British Neighbourhoods, 56 Pol. Stud. 99, 118–19 (2008); Melissa J. Marschall & Dietlind 
Stolle, Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust, 
26 Pol. Behav. 125, 142 (2004) (finding large effect of neighborhood educational attain-
ment); see also David E. Campbell, Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape 
Our Civic Life 64 (2006) (finding that in communities that are looser-knit and more politi-
cally heterogeneous, there is less informal civic engagement but more political activity and 
voting). 
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to the antitheses of residential social capital: low neighboring, weak 
community contribution, and disorderly behavior.160 By locating pros-
perity in solidarity and cooperation, social capital appears to validate the 
reasons whites cite for opposing black entry: concern over community 
decline and falling property values.161 It seems that the sundown signs 
have been replaced by allegedly more benign and “scientific” concerns 
about cooperation and collective action—delicate processes that can be 
undone by heterogeneity as well as by prejudice itself. 
B. Exclusionary Zoning: Social Capital and Local Land Cartels 
The efforts of suburban land cartels to restrain housing supply 
through monopoly zoning and exclusionary land use regulations are a 
topic of great interest and consternation to property law scholars.162 
These regulations include large minimum lot-sizes, zoning exclusively 
for single-family housing, growth controls, and discriminatory enforce-
ment of housing codes against rentals. There has been vigorous debate 
about the “monopoly zoning hypothesis” and its effect on housing con-
sumers.163 The weight of the evidence to date indicates that in localities 
with strong monopoly power and politically powerful homeowners, ex-
clusionary zoning reduces the rate and density of housing development 
below the optimal value of the land in a competitive market.164 This arti-
160 See Lawrence Bobo & Camille L. Zubrinsky, Attitudes on Residential Integration: Per-
ceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?, 74 Soc. Forces 
883, 896 (1996); Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the 
Detroit Area, 100 Am. J. Soc. 750, 769 (1994) (finding that most whites rate blacks as more 
likely to live off of welfare and less easy to get along with); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen 
W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of 
“Broken Windows,” 67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 336–37 (2004).  
161 See Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, 
115 Q.J. Econ. 847, 850, 886 (2000).  
162  See Anthony Downs, New Visions for Metropolitan America 20 (1994). See generally 
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale 
L.J. 385 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls].  
163 It has proven challenging to parse empirically whether price increases are due to the 
impact of land use regulation on improving housing and providing desirable amenities or 
constricting supply (for example, monopoly). See John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, 
The Effects of Land Use Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What 
Can We Learn?, 8 Cityscape 69, 70, 81 (2005) (describing methodological challenges). 
164 See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are Small 
Suburbs the Big Problem?, in Fiscal Decentralization and Land Policies 130 (Gregory K. 
Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2008), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/
2105_1427_LP2007-ch05-Political-Structure-and-Exclusionary-Zoning-Are-Small-Suburbs-
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ficially constricts supply and increases housing prices and segregation. 
Recent evidence from the Pew Foundation shows that economic residen-
tial segregation has increased dramatically across the past three decades; 
racial segregation is declining but substantial.165 We need not specify a 
point of optimal economic, or racial, integration in order to conclude 
that our extraordinarily high level of segregation is concerning.166 
In localities across the United States, social capital helps to effectuate 
land cartels through both informal and formal (legal) coordination to 
maintain exclusionary zoning. High social capital entails dense net-
works, in-group trust, and tastes for participation that facilitate coordina-
tion and bring to light opportunities to engage in monopoly behavior. 
The diamond merchants of New York and other tight-knit groups, laud-
ed for their self-regulation without law, are also examples of how social 
capital promotes oligopoly to the detriment of market efficiency.167 In 
their economic critique of social capital, Durlauf and Fafchamps offer as 
an example collusion to drive up prices between fishing groups from dif-
ferent fishing grounds, selling on the same market, who are connected 
by strong bridging ties and high social capital.168 Applied to local resi-
 
the-Big-Problem.pdf [hereinafter Fischel, Small Suburbs] (concluding that monopoly zoning 
occurs in fragmented metropolitan statistical areas populated with small suburbs). Research 
by James Thorson found that communities with more monopoly power have higher house 
prices but are not more restrictive in producing new housing. Thorson suggested that in addi-
tion to monopoly motivations, wealth effects and illegitimate exclusionary preferences may 
play a role in higher housing costs. See James A. Thorson, An Examination of the Monopoly 
Zoning Hypothesis, 72 Land Econ. 43, 55 (1996).  
165 See Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, Pew 
Research Social and Demographic Trends (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income. 
166 This is particularly true in light of the local nature of school financing and the social 
and individual ill effects of concentrated poverty. See David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, 
Are Ghettoes Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. Econ. 827, 827 (1997) (concluding that blacks in seg-
regated areas have significantly worse outcomes than blacks in integrated areas); cf. Ellick-
son, Social Composition, supra note 140, at 200–02 (arguing that complete integration would 
reduce neighborhood diversity and foreclose options for blacks to live in mostly black 
neighborhoods).  
167 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115–17 (1992); see also Portes, supra note 25, 
at 13, 15 (describing ethnic control of trades and police and fire unions). 
168 Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 98, at 31. In my view, in-group solidarity may miti-
gate collusion between groups by increasing insularity and decreasing inter-group contact. 
However, if there are sufficient incentives and inter-group ties for cooperation, cohesive 
groups reduce the transaction costs of colluding by enabling coordination between a small 
number of groups rather than large numbers of individuals. In addition, structural and market 
conditions may allow monopoly by a single group. 
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dential markets, social capital may effectuate two forms of land carteli-
zation. In a classic cartel, owners and suppliers of housing who wish to 
limit competition from higher-density developments with smaller houses 
enforce zoning and other land use regulations to create an artificial re-
striction on supply and force buyers to pay more for houses. Exclusion-
ary zoning also encompasses non-classic cartels where residents are not 
concerned about competition, but that smaller, higher-density housing 
will draw “undesirables” who will put off prospective buyers and reduce 
property values.169 
Social capital may play a role in political organization to enact exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances and growth controls.170 In an empirical analy-
sis of growth controls, William Fischel found that small suburbs were 
more likely to have strict development and growth restrictions than larg-
er communities.171 Fischel attributes this to the fact that in larger juris-
dictions, developers have more political power while homeowners have 
more difficulty organizing.172 This can also be explained in social capital 
terms with social cohesion mediating the effect of suburb size on exclu-
sionary zoning: In smaller suburbs, greater social cohesion may facilitate 
the spread of information, lower the costs of civic engagement, and re-
cruit residents who have social ties to growth control supporters. Of 
course, social capital is not the sole cause of exclusionary zoning or the 
only possible explanation for this finding—economic incentives and 
other social forces matter too.  
Most fundamentally, social capital facilitates the social regulation 
necessary to maintain and enforce zoning and growth controls.173 Exclu-
sionary zoning is under frequent assault by developers seeking profits 
from higher-density construction as well as from fair housing advocates 
169 I thank Richard Squire for his helpful comments on classic and non-classic cartels. 
170 Readers may question whether Putnam’s social capital—which encompasses political 
organization, legislation, and informal cooperation—is overbroad. I agree with that view and 
accordingly focus most of my attention on what I see as the heart of social capital: its role in 
informal collective action and quasi-formal community self-governance.  
171 Fischel, Small Suburbs, supra note 164, at 130 (noting that areas “whose land-use is 
controlled by very few jurisdictions . . . appear to be subject to the monopoly zoning effect”). 
172 Id. 
173 Social capital-mediated exclusionary zoning recalls the nested institutions and polycen-
tric regulation described in Ostrom’s work: informal collective action to discriminate and 
exclude occurs within local and regional legal regimes. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets 
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 
641, 641–43 (2010).  
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and occasionally state legislatures.174 Maintaining exclusionary zoning 
requires residents to organize, share information, and protest develop-
ment plans, permit requests, and variance requests.175 Neighborhood res-
idents also cooperate to informally ostracize undesirable entrants, in-
cluding minorities and tenants, through mechanisms such as social 
exclusion and gossip.176 High social capital enables “NIMBYism” (not 
in my backyard), as Putnam has recognized, where resident factions or-
ganize committees and protests, lobby government, and in some cases 
pool funds to oppose locally undesirable land uses, such as halfway 
houses and environmental waste sites.177 In the case of affordable hous-
ing, one of the most fever-pitched settings for NIMBY opposition, dense 
ties and a cohesive local identity can intensify and embolden residents’ 
opposition to the “wrong kind of people.” 
Social capital theory itself may justify land use protectionism. Some 
local comprehensive plans suggest that growth controls are necessary to 
maintain their community’s social capital. Communities depict such ef-
forts as “protecting our small-town character” and local stocks of social 
capital.178 For example, the city of Excelsior, Minnesota’s Comprehen-
sive Plan states, under the heading of “Social Capital Actions and Strat-
egy,” that the city must “[i]n all City projects and private redevelop-
ment, consider what impact there will be on small town historic 
character.”179 Interestingly, the Supreme Court case upholding the con-
stitutionality of zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., may 
174 See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: Economics of Inclusionary 
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 Fordham Urb. L.J. 23, 51, 65–68 (1996) (describing arbitrage profit 
incentives for developers to seek density variance and discussing set-asides and other state 
programs for affordable housing); George Lefcoe, California’s Land Planning Requirements: 
The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 447, 485–86 (1980-81) (discussing state legis-
lative and agency efforts to compel inclusionary zoning). 
175 Local governments routinely employ zoning flexibility devices and grant variances, 
which offer case-by-case relief from zoning requirements.  
176 It may be that one important role of the local clubs and organizations so admired by 
Putnam is to signal racial, political, or religious preferences. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Ex-
clusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437, 464–76 (2006) (de-
scribing use of amenities such as golf clubs to signal racial and other preferences). Extending 
this theory from amenities to local organizations, some groups, such as the Junior League 
and Elks for example, are strongly associated with whites.  
177 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22 (conceding that social capital can promote 
NIMBYism). 
178 See, e.g., City of Excelsior, 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Excelsior, Minnesota 147 
(2008), www.ci.excelsior.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=277.  
179 See id. 
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have alluded to a social capital justification in its decision.180 The Court 
described apartments as a “mere parasite” on single-family neighbor-
hoods that zoning must control or a neighborhood’s “desirability as a 
place of detached residences [will be] utterly destroyed.”181 While the 
Court focused on the impact of multi-family units on open space and 
amenities, the opinion’s impassioned tone, repeated references to main-
taining the “residential character” of single-family neighborhoods, and 
use of the term “parasite” suggest that the Court also may have been 
concerned with neighborhood social fabric and cohesion.182 
A remaining question is whether weak social capital channels collu-
sion toward law, as opposed to informal action, as a lower-cost but more 
global and damaging means to effectuate monopoly and entrance re-
straints. Perhaps communities high in social capital can more easily ex-
clude or constrain supply informally, whereas those with modest base-
lines of social capital find it more efficient to enact laws. If true, 
promoting social capital may be the lesser of two evils. While this is a 
plausible theory and may apply to other contexts such as racial exclu-
sion, it is not clear that it tracks patterns of suburban exclusionary zon-
ing. Growth controls are more common in small suburbs, which likely 
boast higher social capital and cohesion.183 Even if low social capital 
does create incentives for harmful legislation, law retains the virtues of 
greater visibility, placement in the public sphere of debate and norm 
construction, and susceptibility to external challenge and revision. 
III. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY: GOVERNING THROUGH SOCIAL CAPITAL
Ostrom’s self-governing collectives have enticed residential property 
and land use scholars with their merger of pro-sociality and efficiency: 
Through close ties with others, people can overcome collective action 
problems and manage resources wisely. Yet, is this rosy picture accu-
rate? Can we rely on social capital’s positive effects to substitute in sub-
stantial share for legal and market institutions in residential property? In 
the past thirty years, states and localities have experimented with formal 
and quasi-formal neighborhood and block-level governance, piloted par-
ticipatory budgeting in districts and wards, relied increasingly on resi-
180 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
181 Id. at 394. 
182 See id. 
183 See Fischel, Small Suburbs, supra note 164, at 130. 
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dents to provide public goods and neighborhood services, and witnessed 
the proliferation of private homeowners associations.184 Robert Nelson 
has advocated for a nationwide system of neighborhood associations, 
comparable to private homeowners and condominium associations, with 
the power to enact regulations, control zoning and development, and 
provide local services.185 Bob Ellickson and Elinor Ostrom have en-
dorsed de-centralizing certain local governance functions to block-level 
and community institutions respectively, with varying degrees of legal 
formality.186 The work of property scholar Paula Franzese contemplates 
downsizing aspects of common interest community law in order to ena-
ble norms-based self-governance within private homeowners associa-
tions.187 
Residential “micro-institutions” offer the advantages of local 
knowledge, cost-savings for local government, and, more debatably, a 
greater sense of personal empowerment or sub-local stake. Yet, they also 
entail problems and tradeoffs. Governing through social capital does not 
reliably safeguard against—and in some circumstances can affirmatively 
promote—rent-seeking, violations of individual rights, and collusion to 
restrain property supply. Devolving governance power, particularly reg-
ulatory and spending power, to resident groups can directly empower 
factions, whose members may be motivated to assume unpaid board po-
sitions and governance roles to advance their interests. Of course, the 
risks of collusion and rent-seeking are not limited to informal govern-
ance, but endemic to a variety of institutions. However, the idealization 
of governing through social capital, coupled with weaker rule of law 
constraints and less transparency, has made the problems of residential 
self-governance less apparent—and in that sense more dangerous. 
Community self-governance also increases the pressure on communi-
ty composition from its already substantial baseline—race, ethnicity, and 
184 See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empow-
ered Participatory Government 10–12, 28 (2003) (reviewing experiments in participatory 
budgeting and neighborhood participation and governance); Evan McKenzie, Common-
Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 14 Housing Pol’y Debate 203, 203–07 
(2003) (describing rise of common interest community housing). 
185 Robert H. Nelson, Private Neighborhoods and the Transformation of Local Govern-
ment 259–78 (2005) [hereinafter Nelson, Private Neighborhoods]. 
186 See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 82–85 (proposing block-level asso-
ciations); Ostrom, supra note 173, at 656–58, 664–65 (2010) (describing successful man-
agement of natural resources by farmers, residents, and other groups and endorsing non-state 
resource governance in some situations). 
187 See Franzese, supra note 19, at 591–92. 
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other class-based characteristics are often misapplied proxies in this pro-
cess. When owners benefit from limiting congestion rather than allowing 
widespread access or participation, coordination costs are high, and in-
terpersonal cooperation is vital, they will try to attract entrants perceived 
to have the strongest tastes for contribution and capacity to integrate into 
a cohesive group. Without some ability to predict the behaviors, prefer-
ences, and interests of others, the costs of governing through social capi-
tal skyrocket. These dynamics ratchet up preferences for homogeneity 
among existing residents and dissuade minority newcomers who face in-
creased hostility and risk of unequal status and participation. In the 
scholarship on residential commons, legal scholars gloss over this issue, 
noting seemingly without upset that “homogenous groups” typically ex-
perience greater success in producing local goods and require less gov-
ernment intervention.188 Yet, should we accept governing by homophily 
in the service of social capital? 
This “logic of homogeneity” may also be at work in Ostrom’s famous 
examples of natural resource commons.189 Admittedly, it is difficult to 
parse the relative contributions of culture, often machismo culture, from 
the homogenizing influence of social capital-fueled commons govern-
ance. Nonetheless, the striking trend toward ethnic exclusion is notewor-
thy. Informally managed fishing grounds are often ethnically homoge-
nous and community-managed acequias (irrigation ditches) in New 
Mexico routinely employ gossip and social sanctions to keep water 
rights from Anglo “newcomers” and within families and communities.190 
In his account of the Maine lobster gangs, James Acheson describes how 
the gangs, replete with social capital, harassed and cut the traps of en-
trants based in part on their ethnicity—even Italian and Canadian back-
grounds were not sufficiently mainstream.191 The “kings” or leaders of 
the lobster gangs also opposed “blacks, . . . hippies, welfare [recipients], 
188 See Foster, supra note 64, at 91–92. 
189 Carol Rose has criticized Ostrom’s commons for their propensity for rigid hierarchies, 
sexism, or other non-egalitarian norms. See Rose, supra note 29, at 33–34. 
190 Telephone Interview with Michael Cox, Assistant Professor, Dartmouth Coll. (Oct. 2, 
2012); Telephone Interview with José A. Rivera, Professor, Univ. of N.M. (Oct. 5, 2012). 
191 James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine 69 (1988). There are also barriers for 
female lobster fishermen, though the 2007 recession has lowered the “glass gangway” as re-
duced profits have dissuaded young men. Chris Arnold, She’s No Man; She’s a Lobsterman, 
Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 19, 2012, 2:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/19/159175781/
fishing-for-lobsters-not-just-a-mans-game. 
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Russians, Jews, bureaucrats, Arabs, and Iran[ians].”192 Entrance is tight-
ly controlled in these communities: in the traditional lobster gangs a boy 
“inherits a place in his father’s gang,” and outsiders, without close affili-
ations to the community or gang, find entry difficult, if not impossi-
ble.193 While member selection is formally absent from Ostrom’s design 
principles for community-governance, her writing describes common 
culture and “rules of the game” as requisite to successful community 
self-governance—indeed, in some accounts shared culture is part of the 
definition of social capital.194 
Some legal scholars and social capitalists have wrongly assumed that 
social capital, properly nourished through participation and self-
governance, will reduce factions and exclusionary harm.195 This miscon-
ception (and some of the appeal of social capital itself) hearkens to the 
anti-federalist idea of civic virtue as the solution to factions. The anti-
federalists emphasized decentralization in small communities that would 
enable the type of interaction necessary to promote civic virtue or “pub-
lic happiness.”196 They championed deliberation and participation in 
town meeting style government to educate citizens in civic virtue and 
restrain self-interested factions from subverting the greater good.197 
However, the anti-federalists recognized the tension between intensive 
self-governance and diversity: Their model of deliberation and civic vir-
tue explicitly required community homogeneity in terms of wealth, edu-
cation, and power.198 
If Elinor Ostrom showed that individuals can resolve collective action 
problems absent legal or government institutions, the legal scholarship 
has not resolved when, or whether, governing by social capital should 
192 Acheson, supra note 191, at 61. 
193 Id. at 65–68; see also Clark C. Gibson & Tomas Koontz, When “Community” Is Not 
Enough: Institutions and Values in Community-Based Forest Management in Southern Indi-
ana, 26 Hum. Ecology 621, 639–40 (1998) (describing how community-managed forest resi-
dential community required members to vouch for and pay the debts of applicants during a 
five-year waiting period). 
194 See Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Irrigation Institutions: Social Capital and Development 
24–25, 29–30 (1990) (noting failure of commons with “individuals coming from different 
regions . . . and ethnic and religious backgrounds” because “[no] social capital exists”). 
195 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 23; Franzese, supra note 19. 
196 For a description of the anti-federalist case, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 35–38 (1985). 
197 See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 43–45 (Murray Dry ed., 
1981). 
198 Sunstein, supra note 196 at 36. 
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play this role in residential property.199 My account of social capital pro-
vides a more critical view of residential self-governance, and under-
scores the need for a substantial overlay of law, as well as other political 
and institutional supports, to channel local collective action to socially 
desirable means and ends. In a similar vein, scholars such as Carol Rose 
and Sheila Foster have suggested the need for a minimal level of law 
and government involvement to mitigate inegalitarianism and free-riding 
in the commons.200 To make my analysis more concrete, the following 
Sections consider proposals and initiatives in neighborhood direct de-
mocracy, block-level associations, and common interest communities. 
A. Assessing Neighborhood Direct Democracy and Block Associations 
Across the country, a number of neighborhood direct democracy initi-
atives have transferred regulatory responsibilities and service provision 
to neighborhoods with the vision of resident self-governance bolstering 
struggling urban areas.201 The Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization 
Program (“NRP”), the most radical experiment in direct neighborhood 
democracy to date, provided twenty million dollars per year for neigh-
borhoods to form neighborhood associations, vote in boards, and create 
and implement neighborhood action plans for affordable housing and 
other revitalization efforts.202 The NRP envisioned that neighborhood 
groups would build social capital that would enable them to realize city 
planning goals with lower costs and higher resident satisfaction.203 On 
balance, the Minneapolis NRP realized some significant successes. 
There were, however, tradeoffs to neighborhood democracy that have 
been neglected in the enthusiasm for grassroots governance. While the 
NRP worked relatively well in homogenous neighborhoods, Edward G. 
199 Ostrom’s self-governing natural resource commons are often found in countries with 
unstable or inadequate markets, legal institutions, and financial resources that make self-
governance attractive or necessary. 
200 See Foster, supra note 64, at 89–90; Rose, supra note 29, at 44. 
201 See Leighninger, supra note 78, at 5–6. See generally Section I.A. 
202 Sarah Elwood, Neighborhood Revitalization Through ‘Collaboration’: Assessing the 
Implications of Neoliberal Urban Policy at the Grassroots, 58 GeoJournal 121, 124 (2002). 
203 The NRP Policy Board goals describe, “When people organize, collect and analyze in-
formation, and become more knowledgeable about their community, they can be significant 
contributors to the revitalization of their neighborhood . . . . Neighborhood revitalization ul-
timately depends on a sense of neighborhood identity . . . .” See NRP, NRP Primer, 
http://www.nrp.org/r2/aboutnrp/Basics/Primer.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013); see also Nel-
son, Private Neighborhoods, supra note 185, at 269; Elwood, supra note 202, at 126–27.  
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Goetz and Mara S. Sidney describe how in majority-tenant, racially and 
economically diverse neighborhoods, white homeowners rapidly coordi-
nated to constrict housing supply and exclude “undesirables” by halting 
rehabilitation of multi-family buildings, gutting a nationally recognized 
program of leasehold cooperatives, and funding conversions of rentals to 
homes.204 In some areas, a hefty chunk of the NRP money funded grants 
and subsidized loans to individual homeowners for home remodeling.205 
Implicit bias and endogenous social dynamics no doubt influenced 
neighborhood governance in the Minneapolis NRP, where white home-
owners dominated boards and black homeowners, non-profits, and ten-
ants who wished to participate were often shut out.206 However, status 
may have also played a pivotal role because of the pressures of collec-
tive governance. The NRP required residents to self-organize and learn 
local government functions with relatively thin legal frameworks and 
limited institutional supports. Inegalitarianism may proliferate within in-
stitutions that govern through social capital in part to reduce the over-
whelming costs of coordination. Social status lowers the costs of collec-
tive action by determining entrance and distributing authority and tasks 
with quick and dirty, widely understood allocation rules.207 In a sense, 
this tracks the unasked question in the Demsetz account of why property 
rights emerge: How do people go about the process of setting up a prop-
204 Edward G. Goetz & Mara S. Sidney, The Impact of the Minneapolis Neighborhood Re-
vitalization Program on Neighborhood Organizations 11–12 (1994); see also Elena Fagotto 
& Archon Fung, Empowered Participation in Urban Governance: The Minneapolis Neigh-
borhood Revitalization Program, 30 Int’l J. Urb. & Regional Res. 638, 645 (2006) (describ-
ing how property and business owners opposed the use of NRP funds for subsidized hous-
ing). 
205 One of the goals of the NRP was to improve housing, so grants to individual owners 
were not outside the program’s scope or expectations. However, the volume and value of 
these grants suggest some degree of rent-seeking. One independent review concluded that 
eighty percent of households assisted by the twenty million dollars in annual funds were 
used to assist homeowners. See Jennifer Turnham & Jessica Bonjorni, Review of Neighbor-
hood Revitalization Initiatives 38–39 (2004), available at http://www.nw.org/network/
pubs/studies/documents/revitalizationReview.pdf.  
206 Low-income residents often lacked the resources, expertise, and campaign power to 
win board positions, or lacked the social ties to assume committee positions. See Goetz & 
Sidney, supra note 204, at 27–29.  
207 There has been a recent wave of research on the use of status to overcome collective 
action problems, but it focuses on how collective action contribution increases social status 
and how free-riding decreases it. See Brent Simpson et al., Status Hierarchies and the Organ-
ization of Collective Action, 30 Soc. Theory 149, 158 (2012) (reviewing research on reputa-
tional gains from contribution to collective action and proposing that social status sequences 
and coordinates collective action). 
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erty system? Systems may, and often do, focus on first in time (earlier 
entrants), prior property holdings, contribution to the group, experience, 
or skill. But, frequently overlooked is the role of ex ante social status, 
often proxied by characteristics such as race, gender, and social class, to 
coordinate property rules and allocate roles and tasks.208 
In light of the costs and pitfalls of governing through social capital, I 
favor a more cabined role for neighborhood direct democracy programs, 
with more limited grants of power and spending authority, robust institu-
tional frameworks, enhanced political process protections, and in some 
cases mandatory inclusion of non-profit and advocacy groups on gov-
ernance boards. Compared to bold initiatives like the NRP, there is 
greater promise in more modest devolutions that utilize existing local 
government infrastructure and thicker institutional constraints. For ex-
ample, several cities have piloted participatory budgeting where local 
government organizes a group of neighborhood residents and communi-
ty non-profits to propose ways to spend a limited, often modest, fund for 
public infrastructure improvements and residents vote on the pro-
posals.209 
My analysis also has implications for prominent scholarly proposals 
for neighborhood and block-level associations in older neighborhoods 
that lack private homeowners associations. Bob Ellickson has advocated 
creating block improvement districts (“BLIDs”) with narrow grants to 
provide supplementary services, such as landscaping and street cleaning, 
and to relax zoning restrictions.210 In my view, the risks of governing 
through social capital underscore the prudence of Ellickson’s limited 
grant of power to BLIDs to provide supplementary services and his pro-
posals for supermajority voting and legal safeguards.211 I am skeptical, 
however, of Ellickson’s related proposal for special Regulatory Block 
Improvement Districts (“RBLIDs”) with regulatory and zoning power 
and, more so, of Robert Nelson’s call for a nationwide system of neigh-
208 Notably, such systems may tend toward rigidity because mobility will create confusion 
about governance authority and muddy the status rules themselves.  
209 Residents in Chicago Ward 49 voted on how to spend a limited pool of infrastructure 
improvement funds (approximately one million dollars) following an extensive process that 
included the involvement of over fifty community groups to develop and oversee the partici-
patory process. See Alderman Joe Moore, Participatory Budgeting, http://www.ward49.com/
participatory-budgeting (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).  
210 See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 96–99. 
211 See id. at 97–98, 103, 104 (proposing supermajority vote for BLID establishment and 
application of common interest community law). 
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borhood associations to regulate land development and zoning, provide 
core services including police, and assume ownership of city streets, 
parks, and facilities.212 The small scale of the neighborhood and espe-
cially the block increases the ease with which both social capital and 
factions develop, as Ellickson seems to intuit in his enumeration of vot-
ing and legal protections for BLIDs.213 Devolving regulatory and spend-
ing power directly to residents enhances the power of homeowner fac-
tions relative to developers and tenants (some of these proposals do not 
allow resident tenants to vote), and can increase cartel-like restrictions 
on housing supply.214 As the Minneapolis NRP experience reveals, there 
is a substantial risk that urban neighborhood self-governance will dis-
place tenants, many of whom live in city neighborhoods as result of ex-
clusionary zoning and the resulting dearth of suburban rental apartments. 
B. Common Interest Communities: Condominiums, Co-ops, and 
Homeowners Associations 
Self-governing private residential communities, such as homeowners 
associations, condominiums, and co-ops, presumably should be incuba-
tors of positive social capital. Yet, high expectations for the realization 
of community and democracy have given way to conflict, litigation, and 
controversies over secession from public life.215 Disputes over noise, 
dogs, cars, and garbage are common and call into question the assump-
tion that social capital will encourage beneficial norms and secure coop-
eration.216 To the contrary, self-governance may intensify residential 
212 See Nelson, Private Neighborhoods, supra note 185, at 259–68; Ellickson, New Institu-
tions, supra note 19, at 99–100; Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal 
to Replace Zoning With Private Collective Property Rights in Existing Neighborhoods, 7 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 833–34, 873 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson, Existing Neighborhoods]. 
213 See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 97–99, 103–04. 
214 It is not clear that developers will be as powerful in these micro-institutions for a varie-
ty of reasons: unlike local government officials, homeowners’ interests are narrowly focused 
on their particular neighborhood or block and the common developer exaction of land or de-
velopment in another part of town will not be of interest to RBLIDs or neighborhood associ-
ations. With respect to voting, Nelson’s proposal does not allow for tenant voting. See Nel-
son, Existing Neighborhoods, supra note 212, at 834. Ellickson’s limited grant BLID does 
not allow tenant voting, but his regulatory RBLID requires approval by supermajorities of 
owner and residents. Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19 at 99–100.  
215 See Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential 
Private Government 26, 135 (1994). 
216 See Domini Hedderman, Managing Conflicts Among Neighbors, N.J. Cooperator, Feb. 
2007, http://njcooperator.com/articles/31/1/Managing-Conflict-Among-Neighbors/Page1.
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discord.217 In a recent survey of common interest communities (“CICs”) 
in Massachusetts, 64% of boards reported being threatened with at least 
one lawsuit in the past five years and 22% were currently in litigation.218 
Research by Henry Hansmann, and more recently by Michael Schill, 
finds that co-operatives, a form of common interest community with 
more intensive self-governance and common property than condomini-
ums, trade at a sizeable discount to similar condominiums.219 Efficiency 
and welfare losses from collective self-governance of common property, 
among other factors, appear to be capitalized into lower co-operative 
sale prices.220 This analysis reveals a problem unresolved by social capi-
talists: the proximity and interdependency that purportedly foster social 
capital also breed conflict about uses, upkeep, and resident behavior.221 
The predominant force resolving these conflicts is not social capital, but 
the growing use of professional management agents.222 
In a thought-provoking article, Paula Franzese has proposed that 
common interest communities have greater legal free rein in order to 
html. A California attorney described fistfights and other physical violence among residents 
or between residents and resident-board members as “not uncommon.” Debora Vrana, The 
Runaway Power of Homeowners Associations, MSN Real Estate, http://realestate.msn.
com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107752 (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).  
217 Admittedly, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as empirical study has been limited 
and frequently undertaken by interested parties, such as trade associations for common inter-
est communities. 
218 Courtney L. Feldscher, Managing Conflict in Community Associations: The Who, 
What, Where, When, and Why 10 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
cairf.org/scholarships/feldscher_study.pdf (independent study of community associations).  
219 See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Effi-
ciency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. Legal Stud. 25, 68 (1991) (concluding that 
the condominium form is somewhat more efficient than the cooperative form and requires a 
smaller subsidy to make it competitive with rental); Michael H. Schill et al., The Condomin-
ium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. 
Legal Stud. 275, 309 (2007) (finding that cooperatives trade at a 13.4 percent discount to 
condominiums). Hansmann also concludes that tax subsidies for ownership and rent control 
encouraged the spread of condominiums and cooperatives despite the fact that rental is the 
more efficient regime. See Hansmann, supra, at 69. 
220 In addition, shared mortgage risk and restraints on resale (for example, co-op interview 
requirements) reduce co-op value. 
221 Moreover, governance by one’s peers poses its own problems. As one attorney ob-
served, “When you have a neighbor being put in charge of you, it just breeds resentment.” 
See Vrana, supra note 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
222 The role of management agents, much neglected in property law, appears key to 
providing an intermediary and a coordinator who acts in a professional, non-peer role. See 
Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 222 (1996) (noting growth of management 
firms). 
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promote, and capitalize upon, their social capital.223 In her view, social 
capital is better nourished by a less heavy-handed legal framework than 
the current panoply of state laws, conditions, covenants, and restrictions 
(“CC&Rs”), and community rules.224 She recommends paring the com-
mon interest community legal declaration to a few core rules integral to 
the community’s structure and allowing social capital to take root before 
considering additional rules, as well as limiting association intervention 
to nuisance-like activities.225 Franzese’s point is well taken that poor de-
sign and legal excess hinder common interest communities. However, 
while some culling may be beneficial, I do not believe dramatically 
downsizing formal law in favor of informal self-governance will amelio-
rate conflicts within these communities. 
As a threshold matter, it is an unanswered empirical question whether 
common interest community laws impede or foster positive social capi-
tal. Cross-country research by Frank Cross suggests that in some con-
texts law can increase trust by providing assurances and incentives for 
trustworthy behavior.226 In later work, it seems Franzese agrees, as she 
subsequently proposes more substantial legal protections for common 
interest communities to promote trust.227 In my view, reducing common 
interest community law to a minimal core increases opportunities for 
rent-seeking. Supermajority voting requirements for amending key gov-
ernance provisions, thick legal protections, and perhaps even the com-
plexity of common interest community rules create if not formal checks 
and balances, at least obstacles to radical redistribution at the hands of 
resident factions (factions on the board are less constrained under some 
CIC governing laws).228 In addition, state law, CC&Rs, and associational 
223 See Franzese, supra note 19, at 589–91. 
224 See id at 591. 
225 See id. at 591–92. 
226 See Cross, supra note 128, at 1460. 
227 See Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest 
Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1111, 1139–47 (2007) (recommend-
ing sunsetting developer-imposed servitude regimes to enable communities to select from 
regulatory “templates” and adopting more homeowner protections). 
228 Franzese’s desire to limit the board’s power seems to recognize the threat that self-
interested members will assume unpaid board positions or that social capital will develop 
over time between board members and motivate rent-seeking or illiberalism. See Franzese, 
supra note 19, at 591. However, narrowly circumscribing board authority also limits the 
board’s power to address damaging spillovers of social capital and other conflicts among 
residents.  
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rules may have some degree of expressive value and communicate rule 
of law expectations to members and boards.  
Common interest communities also confront exclusionary proclivities 
and incentives to reduce the costs of self-governance through homoge-
neity, often proxied by class-based characteristics.229 Reducing rules to a 
minimal core increases the pressure on self-governance and the already 
substantial demand for homogeneity. The limited reach and enforcement 
of the federal Fair Housing Act, and some state fair housing statutes, do 
not provide adequate redress.230 Accordingly, CIC laws that inhibit ex-
cessive development, or undesirable deployment, of social capital may 
have substantial public value. 
In closing, governing residential property through social capital, ab-
sent substantial institutional safeguards, may be an uneasy fit for devel-
oped and diverse societies. Perhaps these issues are part of the reason 
why residential self-governance in the United States often does not look 
much like Ostrom’s commons at all. Despite the popular enthusiasm for 
grassroots governance, local micro-institutions often have limited pow-
ers and substantial legal constraints, and in some cases, such as Boston’s 
famous Dudley Street Initiative, extensive support from government and 
non-profit institutions.231 At the end of the day, governing through social 
capital in residential micro-institutions is neither the apogee of civic 
communitarianism nor the apocalypse of pluralism. It is an inexorable 
part of the cost-savings necessitated by federal devolution and more lim-
ited fiscs for states and cities. And for my purposes, it is a point of re-
flection for the misguided expectations for social capital. 
229 As Henry Hansmann observes, “[C]onflicts among members are a serious problem in 
the governance of cooperatives and condominiums . . . [and] homogeneity of membership is 
an important aid to viability.” Hansmann, supra note 222, at 201; see also Lior Jacob Strahi-
levitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1858–
59 (2006) (describing the exclusionary proclivities of common interest communities and 
their use of “exclusionary amenities” such as golf clubs or Catholic universities to signal 
their preferences for residents). For other accounts of preferences for residential exclusion, 
see McKenzie, supra note 215, at 60–78; Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in 
the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Inte-
grated Society, 59 Am. Soc. Rev. 23, 28–29 (1994). 
230 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006); John Yinger, Sustaining 
the Fair Housing Act, 4 Cityscape 93, 98 (1999) (describing the history of the Fair Housing 
Act and the underlying political compromises that led to an “almost ludicrous” lack of feder-
al enforcement authority and capacity).  
231 See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the 
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1061, 1077–81 (1995). 
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IV. RESIDENTIAL NORMS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND SMALL REPUBLIC
THINKING 
Using property law to promote social capital would be less troubling 
if we could predict that the instrumentality of social capital would be re-
liably coupled with positive residential norms that would restrain dark 
side dynamics. As discussed previously, social capital alone does not of-
fer built-in constraints on bad behavior. In the residential context, civic 
republican ideals cling to property, but imperfectly (some scholars have 
suggested near-schizophrenically)232 and often faintly when one is con-
templating her own residential property rather than her perceptions of 
others’ obligations vis-à-vis their property. These shortcomings of pub-
lic-minded sensibility in residential property are implicit in the vigorous 
efforts of property scholars such as Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Pe-
ñalver to inculcate and disseminate public-regarding property norms.233 
Anemic other-regarding residential norms create a substantial risk of 
harm from social capital, particularly with respect to restraining housing 
supply and entrance. Contrary to Madison, the problem of factions act-
ing against the public good may not be due to small republics so much 
as small republic thinking. 
This point is most precisely understood through the sociological theo-
ry of roles. Roles entail shared norms for a given social position that de-
fine the expected behavior of the role-holder.234 In the constitutional are-
na, Bruce Ackerman has conceptualized mixed public citizen and private 
citizen roles and explored their importance to a dualist Constitution.235 In 
the residential context, the combination of private and public orienta-
tions and activities appears to produce a mixed public- and private-
regarding residential property role. Commitments to equality, altruism, 
or public citizenship ideals matter somewhat or sometimes. One can 
point to examples of local action with respect to climate change or hu-
232 See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561–62 (1984) (discussing how civic republican and economic perspec-
tives stratify takings jurisprudence). 
233 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
Cornell L. Rev. 745, 760–73 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L. 
Rev. 1889, 1963–64 (2005). 
234 See Ralph H. Turner, Role Theory, in Handbook of Sociological Theory 233, 233–34 
(Jonathan H. Turner ed., 2001). 
235 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 232–35 (1991). 
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man rights.236 Also, abundant social capital may carry fewer negative ex-
ternalities when the residential norm or role sub-type relates to certain 
kinds of local public institutions. For example, local public (albeit lim-
ited-access) institutions such as schools and parks may orient residents 
toward public-mindedness, at least with respect to these activities or 
“sub-roles” (though notably any public citizenship attached to schools 
has not secured de facto school desegregation). On balance, however, 
the residential property role remains strongly local group-regarding and 
private-regarding. It is more private-spirited and insular than how one 
might conceive one’s role as a student or an African American or a na-
tional voter. The residential owner role in particular comprises a per-
ceived prerogative to exert control over housing supply and the social 
composition of residents. 
Residential property norms are strongly, though not exclusively, root-
ed in the economics of residential ownership. Homeowners, as William 
Fischel has described, have a strong motivation to maintain and enhance 
the value of their large, undiversified assets: their homes.237 This exces-
sive ownership stake encourages local investments that increase property 
values, including beneficial contributions to schools and environmental 
quality as well as harmful investments in racial exclusion and exclusion-
ary zoning.238 It seems possible, even probable, that this defensiveness of 
self-interest in one’s residential property fails to update in perfect Bayes-
ian fashion and instead generalizes to a degree to other property con-
texts, including public residential contexts. These norms may spill over 
to affect tenants, albeit more weakly. 
Historical patterns of land collusion and exclusion also affect norms 
of residential property behavior. Exclusionary zoning has been well es-
tablished for decades and sanctioned by the Supreme Court.239 Given the 
reinforcement of these norms through weak state and federal laws, it is 
not surprising that land cartelization and NIMBYism are little-
questioned aspects of residential life. With respect to racial and ethnic 
exclusion, there is a historical resonance to subordinating individual 
236 See, e.g., Taking the Local Road to Copenhagen: ICLEI USA’s Primer on the Role of 
Local Governments in an International Climate Agreement, ICLEI Loc. Gov’ts for Sustaina-
bility USA, http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/affecting-policy/international-policy-re
sources/taking-the-local-road-to-copenhagen (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
237 See Fischel, supra note 31, at 3–19, 281.  
238 See id. 
239 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–96 (1926). 
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equality to residential property rights, the rhetoric of community, and lo-
cal property values. Neighborhood associations and resident cooperation 
are strongly associated with their long history of extra-legal and legal 
maintenance of segregation.240 Indeed, exclusion may be one of the more 
resonant ways that communities conceive of and experience collective 
action. 
These tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that for homeowners, 
who represent a majority share of the national population, ownership is 
conceptualized as a civic moment. Longstanding and influential senti-
ments dating to Jefferson and civic republicanism aver a corporeal land 
stake in the country as a cultivator of civic capacity.241 According to Jef-
ferson and other influential thinkers, property makes individuals trust-
worthy as democratic citizens and voters by assuring independence and 
developing their civic faculties.242 Thus, it may be that with respect to 
national or public citizenship, property ownership allows some resting 
on your laurels—by becoming a property owner one has already dis-
charged an important act of public citizenship. There is also an intuition, 
correct in some contexts but not in others, that contributing to one’s lo-
cal community substantially fulfills obligations to the national good. 
Resident provision of certain local goods does enable government sav-
ings by shifting costs and service responsibilities to citizens. However, 
this is a more modest contribution than the popular understanding of lo-
cal activity and property ownership as realizing citizenship and democ-
racy.243 
240 See Loewen, supra note 142; Sugrue, supra note 143, at 215–25. 
241 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in The Life and Se-
lected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 632–34 (photo. reprint 1946) (Adrienne Koch & Wil-
liam Peden eds., 1944); Stern, supra note 80, at 922–25 (detailing civic republican virtues 
attributed to ownership). 
242 As Jefferson explained: 
Here [in America] every one may have land to labor for himself . . . . Every one, by 
his property, or by his satisfactory situation, is interested in the support of law and or-
der. And such men may safely and advantageously reserve to themselves a wholesome 
control over their public affairs, and a degree of freedom, which, in the hands of the 
canaille of the cities of Europe, would be instantly perverted to the demolition and de-
struction of everything public and private.  
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 241, at 633. 
243 In light of the subsidies for homeownership and the social contribution of tenants, the 
benefits from ownership and homeowners’ social contribution may be less than assumed. 
See Stern, supra note 80, at 929–32. 
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Today, social capital plays a similar role in cultural thought by reify-
ing orientations toward individualistic or small republic thinking with 
the inflated promise that group action yields national dividends. Social 
capitalists allege that cooperating to advance private or local self-interest 
in a group bound by social ties, trust, and norms of reciprocity creates 
positive spillovers for national democracy, economy, and citizen flour-
ishing.244 In the context of local working together, we can be less con-
cerned about our obligations to the welfare of others, at least others be-
yond our group, because our very cooperation produces societal 
benefits. Social capital theory thus entrenches private-regarding norms 
by eliding a balancing between broader social benefits and local group 
interests and claiming that action to advance the latter will provide the 
former. This is perhaps the local resident version of “doing well by do-
ing good.” 
If self- or local-focus is largely due to economic incentives and histor-
ical determinants, one might question whether it matters if social capital 
and small republic thinking suppress civic virtue that would not find ex-
pression regardless. This view neglects the noisiness and variability to 
whether negative spillovers and collusion occur, based on the sum of 
factors such as transaction costs, political influence, the magnitude of 
the risk or effect on property values, the availability of explicit or im-
plicit compensation, and residential norms. In addition, to the extent that 
social capital advances a norm-neutral approach and encourages com-
placency toward broader social obligations, it may forestall positive 
normative changes that would be capitalized into home prices and there-
by lessen negative homeowner dynamics. For example, as prejudice 
against black entry into majority-white communities decreases through 
social movements and norm change, drops in housing prices from black 
residents should also decrease, further attenuating homeowner opposi-
tion.245 These normative changes may be slower to occur in an age of 
social capital thinking that elevates residential gemeinschaft to noble 
civic purpose and depicts local, private-regarding activity as public citi-
zenship. 
244 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 288–89.  
245 See Bobo & Zubrinsky, supra note 160, at 885–87 (1996). 
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V. BEYOND GEMEINSCHAFT PROPERTY 
The promise of social capital is its capacity to resolve prisoners’ di-
lemmas. Communities are better off when residents cooperate to clean 
up parks, refrain from littering, and “keep eyes on the streets.”246 The 
classic prisoners’ dilemma is two prisoners who are jointly best off by 
cooperating to remain silent but face incentives to defect and secure 
lighter sentences by unilaterally confessing. The prisoners’ dilemma il-
lustrates how individuals acting rationally to advance their self-interest 
may, as a group, end up worse off. Of course, as any economist recog-
nizes, resolving the prisoners’ dilemma maximizes the prisoners’ joint 
utility but does not speak to whether society would be better off if the 
prisoners (let us assume they murdered innocent bystanders) remained in 
prison. More precisely, the value of social capital to prisoners’ dilemmas 
in residential property relies on the assumption that there are limited 
negative externalities from cooperation or the precursors to cooperation. 
This Article questions that assumption in light of historical and mod-
ern-day examples of residential social capital. Many property scholars 
have aligned with social capitalists in the mission of promoting social 
capital through property law and property institutions through social 
capital.247 They endorse the view that property law and institutions 
should produce local social capital by encouraging social interaction, in-
creasing ownership, raising the costs of exit, and devolving governance 
responsibilities to resident groups as “incubators of local social capi-
tal.”248 These accounts neglect the risks and costs of abundant local so-
cial capital and vesting control of property in solidaristic mini-societies. 
The local civil society of bonding social capital is an internally cohesive 
but nationally fragmented social structure that can close off property, 
fuel factions and cartels, and dilute orientations toward national interests 
and the public good. Cohesive social capital can also limit information 
diffusion, suppress innovation, and chill dissent and non-conformity.249 
And if communities must be tight-knit, gemeinschaft enclaves to pros-
per, then similarity and social proximity are the coin of the realm. 
246 I thank Bob Ellickson for his helpful comments and questions on this point.  
247 See supra Section I.A. 
248 Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84. See generally supra Section I.A. 
249 See Levi, supra note 118, at 51–52 (“Historically, there is reason to believe that 
maintenance of close networks blocks innovation and reinforces traditionalism, generally in 
the form of closed economies.” (footnote omitted)); Portes, supra note 25, at 15–16. 
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To be clear, my claim is not that the rotary club should be stricken 
from the local landscape, neighbors should structure their relations with-
in formal rules, or that participatory local government initiatives and 
community-building are inevitably harmful. Indisputably, the constituent 
elements of social capital have value in some contexts. Social interaction 
and informal regimes of sharing information and resources can convey 
benefits to participants and to society. Certain types of social capital 
lower the costs of political organizing. Social institutions, norms, and 
conventions fill gaps within laws (and in some cases are law, properly 
defined). It may be that social capital is more productive in contexts oth-
er than residential property, such as schools or families, where norms 
and roles are better aligned with social welfare enhancement, substitutes 
for social capital are scarce, or self-governance is critical to personal or 
social identity. In the residential setting, perhaps social capital is best 
understood as necessary but dangerous. Some baseline of social capital, 
or at least some of its constituent elements, is necessary to residential 
life. But excessive bonding capital or social capital tethered to bad 
norms can wreak substantial harm. 
If social capital is to retain a role in property law we must disaggre-
gate its component parts and consider their individual utility in specific 
residential contexts. I offer some preliminary thoughts here. Many of the 
elements of social capital, such as social ties, particularized trust, civic 
engagement, participation, and shared norms, can be employed for good 
or ill. To develop useful legal constructs, we must turn to the task of par-
ticularizing these concepts and animating them with normative content. 
Examples include norms of respecting personal property or Robert 
Sampson’s research on diffuse norms of neighborhood social regula-
tion.250 Disaggregation also necessitates context-specific analyses: the 
scale and nature of the desired collective action affect the value of vari-
ous elements of social capital. For example, research suggests that local 
friendship ties increase neighborhood social cohesion but not participa-
tion in public events or willingness to address extra-local social prob-
lems.251 Perhaps the most intriguing and promising aspect of social capi-
tal for residential property is the development of generalized trust (the 
belief that strangers can generally be trusted). Generalized trust creates 
250 I thank Daniel Markovits for his comments about norms of respecting personal proper-
ty. For more detail on norms of local social regulation, see Sampson, supra note 36, at 171–
72. 
251 See id. at 216–17. 
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the preconditions for broad social exchange, minimizes the need to make 
provisions to control opportunistic behavior, creates fewer negative ex-
ternalities than in-group trust or social ties, and has the potential to open 
residential communities.252 In his empirical study of law and trust, Frank 
Cross contends that law can serve as a bridging tie that promotes social 
trust.253 Of course, promoting generalized trust is not invariably success-
ful or positive.254 For example, generalized trust is both reciprocal to and 
reliant on trustworthiness (without a substantial level of trustworthiness 
in the population, generalized trust will not develop, and if it does it will 
make residents vulnerable to deceit and trickery). 
The balance of this Part considers the role of formal law and then 
turns to potential objections to my account of social capital’s dark side 
in residential property. I save the constructive task of developing typol-
ogies of social capital harm and corresponding legal correctives for fu-
ture work. My contention here about law and social capital is plain: the 
chief role of property law is not to promote social capital, at least in its 
aggregate form, but to address its negative spillovers and illiberal ef-
fects. Carol Rose apprehends these concerns in her argument for a mod-
est overlay of egalitarianism-protecting law in property commons.255 In 
my view, the need for law to support and constrain residential self-
governance and local social capital applies with substantial force, and 
somewhat thicker legal institutions, than envisioned by Rose and cer-
tainly Dagan and Heller.256 
Some aspects of the role of law in addressing social capital’s dark 
side should not be controversial. Most social capitalists would support 
legal protections against discrimination, such as the Fair Housing Act. 
252 See Bo Rothstein & Dietlind Stolle, The State and Social Capital: An Institutional The-
ory of Generalized Trust, 40 Comp. Pol. 441, 441–43 (2008) (finding that experiences with 
street-level bureaucrats in order-maintaining and public welfare government institutions af-
fect generalized trust).  
253 See Cross, supra note 128, at 1522–27, 1542 (“[T]he law . . . can enhance bridging so-
cial capital, increasing the total level of trust in society and preventing some of the discrimi-
natory effects of trust.”). 
254 Notably, there is emerging evidence that high generalized trust may decrease the devel-
opment of norms of social order, specifically citizen readiness to obey laws and regulations. 
See van Deth & Zmerli, supra note 133, at 635. If this hypothesis proves true, it would mud-
dy any neat relationship between law and social trust. Laws that are successful at creating 
social trust might ultimately lessen norms of law-abidingness which, over time, would re-
duce laws’ efficacy, both functionally and in promoting trust. 
255 See Rose, supra note 29, at 44.  
256 See id.; Dagan & Heller, supra note 130, at 596. 
    
868 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:811 
More controversially, however, I suggest that high bonding social capi-
tal may necessitate laws to limit, diffuse, or deconstruct residential so-
cial capital (particularly when law cannot directly reach social capital 
harms due to its design or enforcement, or when the costs of exit are 
high).257 Alternatively, building social capital within a greater number of 
distinct groups (that is, pluralism) has potential to lessen dark side dy-
namics; however, this does not translate well to the context of homoge-
nous localities and the harms that spillover to groups outside the local 
political process. This point underscores the importance of the level of 
government that is involved. Depending on the particular issue and cir-
cumstances, negative social capital dynamics may benefit from legal 
controls at different levels of government (for instance, there is little in-
centive for localities that gain from an exclusionary practice to adopt 
laws restraining it, and intervention must come from federal or state 
government). In some cases, swift legal intervention may be important 
to subdue negative social capital dynamics before they spiral—and be-
fore participants capture the political process. With respect to residential 
self-governance, formal law can mitigate illiberalism by providing 
frameworks and rule infrastructure that lessen the cost of coordination 
and cooperation, as well as the attendant pressures toward homogeneity 
and status-based allocations. Legal institutions can also reduce “diversi-
ty anxiety” by providing rules, safeguards, and supports that signal rule 
of law values and opportunities for recourse. 
Addressing social capital harms requires a variety of legal tools, in-
cluding direct restrictions, political process safeguards or correctives, in-
centives, and, in some instances, use of thicker institutions rather than 
informal self-governance. Co-governance where groups manage proper-
ty within a substantial framework of state-created law and oversight of-
fers one intermediate solution to the problems of governing residential 
property through social capital (notably, the much-vaunted commons of 
the lobster gangs and fisheries have moved to co-governance and col-
laborative resource management with state and federal government).258 
Concededly, legal design often strays from the optimal. Peter Schuck’s 
work has examined the tendency of law to be heavy-handed, costly and 
257 Social capitalists also do not address whether high social capital should remain a goal 
in contexts where the scope of law or meager enforcement does not reach social-capital driv-
en harms. 
258 See, e.g., James M. Acheson, Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage 
the Maine Lobster Industry 97–101 (2003).  
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inefficient, reductionist due to the need for simple categorizations, and 
biased in favor of powerful interests or the status quo.259 He also de-
scribes the shortcomings and unintended consequences of aggressive di-
versity programs.260 While I acknowledge the variable quality of law, 
there are certainly legal frameworks that function effectively (that is, 
more efficiently than no law). Indeed, well designed laws often fade to 
the background precisely because they are working quietly and efficient-
ly.  
Some scholars have argued that law is at odds with social capital and 
trust. Larry Ribstein asserts that law can discourage trust-creating social 
capital in private and business associations by creating monitoring obli-
gations and reducing exclusivity.261 Putnam’s work at times views law as 
a sign of crumbling social capital rather than an independent, positive 
social good.262 Yet, laws protecting individual rights and community 
flourishing are not inevitably at odds. Robert Post describes how tort, 
privacy, and other laws often simultaneously protect community and in-
dividuals by protecting essential community norms that constitute both 
individuals and society.263 He observes that the interdependency between 
individuals and community “makes possible a certain kind of human 
dignity and autonomy that can exist only within the embrace of commu-
nity norms.”264 In residential property, law and legal debate have often 
vacillated in a binary fashion between community interests and individ-
ual rights.265 Perhaps properly understood, laws that safeguard individual 
rights against the excesses of social capital also protect community, both 
local territorial communities and broader communities of interest. 
259 See Peter H. Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance 4–6, 16–
17, 428 (2000) (examining costs of legal complexity and the inefficiencies of blunt legal cat-
egorization); Peter H. Schuck & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting in Social Programs 46–49, 
131–33 (2006) (discussing problematic legal distributions and policy inefficiencies from bad 
bets). 
260 Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance 58–61, 
186, 309–11 (2003). 
261 See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 553, 584 (2001). 
262 Putnam, supra note 2, at 144–47. 
263 Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains 62–64 (1995). 
264 See id. at 51. 
265 For example, some of the discourse over residential exclusion has framed harms in 
terms of individual injuries and rights, with lesser attention to harms to communities, either 
local or national. See, e.g., Jonathan Kaplan & Andrew Valls, Housing Discrimination as a 
Basis for Black Reparations, 21 Pub. Aff. Q. 255, 265–69 (2007); Margery Austin Turner, 
Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Hous-
ing Markets, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 797, 809–13 (2008). 
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A. Political Organizing, Low-Income Communities, and Social Capital 
One objection to my account is whether there is a better case for pro-
moting social capital to support political organizing, particularly in low-
income communities that cannot afford substitutes for social capital (for 
instance, private security and services). Barriers to organizing, including 
low social capital, have undeniably disadvantaged low-income commu-
nities in the political process.266 Yet, it is questionable whether the target 
of this Article, insular bonding social capital promoted through residen-
tial law, is a critical precursor of political organizing for poor neighbor-
hoods. Dense and strong social ties and norms of reciprocity, key ele-
ments of social capital, are often present in disadvantaged 
communities.267 Notably, research shows that such social capital can 
create networks that integrate criminals into communities and lessen the 
regulatory effect of neighborhood social cohesion and norms of social 
control on crime.268 If low-income communities must bolster social capi-
tal, developing it through participation in public institutions or bridging 
ties that draw citizens into broader political communities may be more 
beneficial than promoting neighborhood bonding capital.269 
The skills of organizing and institution-building, or agents with these 
qualities, may be what is most important to political participation.270 As 
Part III illustrates, residential self-governance does not reliably develop 
residents’ institution-building capacities (and if it did, a question would 
remain whether self-governance reduces the time, energy, and social 
capital available for political organizing). Findings by Robert Sampson 
underscore the important role of leaders and agents.271 The penetration 
266 See generally Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Politi-
cal Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (2012). 
267 See Christopher R. Browning et al., The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, 
Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods, 83 Soc. Forces 503, 523 
(2004). 
268 See id. at 523–24 (“While networks promote neighborhood cohesion and informal so-
cial control orientations, they also generate network-based social capital . . . that may inhibit 
more consequential forms of social control.”); Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organi-
zation of Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto, 103 Am. J. Soc. 82, 95–97 (1997) (find-
ing that dense and strong social ties lessened support for efforts to rid neighborhood of 
gangs); cf. Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences 69–70 (1999) (reporting similar find-
ings in study of middle-income black Chicago neighborhood).  
269 Cf. Sampson, supra note 36.  
270 I thank Henry Hansmann for his insights on this point.  
271 See Sampson, supra note 36, at 348, 369–70 (studying the effect of urban leadership 
structures and the social networks that connect leaders within communities). 
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of non-profit organizations, not strong and dense ties, predicts communi-
ty collective action (for instance, protests, fundraisers, and neighborhood 
events).272 Social capital is not absent from this process (a common vo-
cabulary, minimal baseline of trust, and social networks help), but it is 
not front and center. Research is just beginning to determine which types 
of institutions produce positive outcomes in low-income communities. 
Some of this scholarship can appear partisan, with proponents arguing 
for favored institutions.273 Rather than micro-level social engineering, it 
may be more beneficial to bluntly subsidize non-profit institutions and 
allow politics, donations, and social forces to roughly sort out valuable 
institutions for individual communities. 
B. The Social Production of Neighborhood and Individual Capacity 
Retreat from local social capital building may be problematic if high 
social capital or property self-governance is critical to the social produc-
tion of neighborhoods or the identity of residents. In some instances 
where we find solidarity and social capital most appealing, the 
non-market or non-legal nature of the interaction is critical to the pro-
duction of social units and identities, such as family, friend, or congrega-
tion. For example, Bob Ellickson’s writing on social norms within the 
family recognizes norms against monetization of services and contract-
ing within the household as important to the social construction of the 
household, as well as efficient.274 Similarly, hiring a professional PTA 
would not be an effective substitute for a parent-led school association. 
Much of the value of the PTA is that children observe their parents’ par-
ticipation and infer the value of education. 
Promoting local social capital or informal governance of residential 
property does not appear comparably important to producing the social 
unit of the neighborhood or individual identities.275 Most people rely on 
nonterritorial communities for a sense of community and strong social 
272 See id. at 214–17. 
273 See Brinig, supra note 17, at 887 (advocating for Catholic schools); Fischel, supra note 
17, at 113 (advocating for traditional local public schools and against a school voucher sys-
tem).  
274 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth 28–29, 
102–06 (2008). 
275 I thank Amy Kapczynski for her helpful questions about the role of property in produc-
ing identities.  
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ties.276 For example, in response to the survey question, “what are the 
ways in which you get a real sense of belonging or sense of communi-
ty,” over seventy percent of respondents cited family and non-neighbor 
friends.277 Decades of research establish that neighborhoods are charac-
terized by weak ties and residents have on average only a handful of 
strong friendship ties in their community—and that they prefer it this 
way.278 Even ethnic enclaves, long idealized in academia, serve primari-
ly as way-stations that help new immigrants gain economic footing, at 
which point they often depart.279 My claim here is not that the neighbor-
hood—particularly resident involvement in local schools or organiza-
tions—invariably lacks meaning. It is that in view of the comparatively 
weak construct of neighborhood and the organic social capital already 
present in communities, retreat from promoting social capital is unlikely 
to threaten individual or neighborhood identity. Moreover, indiscrimi-
nately devolving governance and public goods provision to residents ap-
pears as likely to harm as to benefit any communal social meaning vest-
ed in neighborhoods by breeding conflict.280 
What about the role of social capital and collective action in develop-
ing individual capacities? This theory traces to John Stuart Mill’s asser-
276 See Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social Ties at the Neighborhood Level: 
Two Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 Urb. Aff. Rev. 92, 103 (1999). Data averaged across the 
period of 1974–1996 reveal that more than one-quarter of respondents never spent a social 
evening with neighbors, approximately 15% spent a social evening with neighbors once a 
month, and approximately 12% several times a month. See id. at 99 tbl.1. The amount of so-
cializing with friends is nearly double. See id. The comparatively weak attachment to neigh-
borhood and community is also reflected in the mobility data with homeowners reporting a 
median stay of only 8.2 years in each residence. See William M. Rohe et al., The Social 
Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 13 (Joint Ctr. 
for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 2001), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/liho01-12.pdf. 
277 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 274, 275 fig.77. One-third or less of respondents cited lo-
cal community or neighbors. See id. 
278 The average person has approximately a dozen strong social ties but only two or three 
of those ties are to neighbors. See I-Neighbors Encourages Local Bonds, MIT Tech Talk 3, 3 
(2004), available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2004/techtalk49-1.pdf ; see also Sampson, 
supra note 36, at 170–71 (noting how people desire trust with their neighbors but not neces-
sarily thick ties); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of 
Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1122–24 (2009) (reviewing literature on weak ties in resi-
dential communities).  
279 Notably, recent demographic trends show that more immigrants are settling directly in 
the suburbs rather than gateway cities. See Marie Price & Lisa Benton-Short, Migrants to the 
Metropolis 19 (2008). 
280 See, e.g., supra Section III.A–B. 
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tion that voluntary action educates citizens socially and democratically, 
producing happier, more thoughtful and civic-minded individuals.281 My 
analysis demonstrates more variable outcomes from group engagement 
in residential settings. Voluntary action at times can produce illiberal 
exclusion and collusive activity that provides an anti-social education.282 
Even ostensibly positive or pro-social participation, such as serving on 
one’s condominium board, frequently results in citizen-participants de-
parting frustrated or demoralized, rather than brimming with civic gravi-
tas. There is also no evidence that private-regarding residential norms 
and local collective action (or collusion) create trust, goodwill, or pro-
social motivations that enable generosity or wealth redistribution in oth-
er, non-residential contexts. The research on self-preferencing in-groups, 
as well as social capital’s claim that local cooperation delivers national 
dividends, give us little reason to anticipate that extra-local altruistic be-
havior will spring from residential solidarity.283 
Even the evidence for increased happiness from social capital is thin. 
In the Community Benchmark survey, Putnam reports that higher social 
capital correlates with greater happiness and community satisfaction.284 
However, this finding is subject to reverse causation, meaning that per-
haps happier people are more likely to participate in activities, trust oth-
ers, and possess social ties that would yield high social capital scores. A 
well-established body of research on happiness also undermines a con-
tinuous positive relationship between social capital and happiness: while 
social ties are important to happiness, people are highly individualized 
in the amount of socializing they require, and many are happy with a 
relatively small number of satisfying relationships.285 In addition, some 
of the sociological research suggests that solidaristic communities can 
be quite unhappy places for the successful who are burdened by requests 
for favors, loans, and jobs.286 
281 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 121 (John Gray ed., 1991).  
282 See supra Part II. 
283 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
284 See The Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Social Capital Community 
Benchmark Survey Executive Summary 1, 7 (2001), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/
communitysurvey/docs/exec_summ.pdf. 
285 See, e.g., John T. Caccioppo & William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature and the 
Need for Social Connection 94 (2008).  
286 See Portes, supra note 25, at 16. 
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C. Alternatives for Generalized Solidarity 
Do property gemeinschafts and social capital encourage a valuable 
sense of solidarity that may be otherwise lacking in modern society? 
Solidarity may bind citizens together with shared purpose and mission 
and encourage social contribution, redistribution, and individual and na-
tional flourishing. Putnam’s bridging social capital tracks the concept of 
broad, cross-cutting solidarity.287 Without platforms for solidarity, col-
lective identity may founder and endanger collective action, democratic 
participation, and the polity. At the extreme, a society may develop an-
omie, where the collective conscience frays and norms and moral regu-
lation no longer check individual appetites and ambitions.288 
I am dubious of the threat of anomie or other solidarity harms from 
more limited residential self-governance or decreased local social capi-
tal-building initiatives (assuming such efforts are even effective at creat-
ing social capital). First, other institutions, such as religion, schools, and 
the workplace, appear at least as central, and likely more, to moral 
norms and collectivism than residential property.289 Within the residen-
tial context, it is not evident that greater social distance and less dense 
social ties threaten normlessness or anomie. At the larger residential 
scale of cities, people rely on norms and shared moral conceptions to 
navigate communities and coordinate interactions under conditions of 
high population density and relative anonymity. For example, city resi-
dents develop widely understood norms to govern such issues as street 
parking, queues, and behavior in public spaces—these norms have so-
cializing as well as communicative value.290 
Second, there are other, more encompassing forms of solidarity—
tight-knit localism is not the only option. Retreating from local solidarity 
287 See Putnam, supra note 2, at 22–24. 
288 See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 304–08 (1984) (describing an-
omie as an unusual and pathological social condition resulting from sudden economic or so-
cial change). 
289 See, e.g., supra Section V.B. Also, the narrative that diversity may threaten moral regu-
lation and norms is questionable in the residential context if laments about the alienation and 
social competition in homogenous American suburbs have any truth. See The Evolution of 
Home Ownership, HomeInsight, http://www.homeinsight.com/details.asp?url_id=7 (last vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2013). Durkheim recognized the point that mechanical solidarity and greater 
similarity can increase competition at least in the economic sense. See Durkheim, supra note 
288, at 210. 
290 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 
81 (1985) (describing the practice of reserving shoveled parking spaces on public streets 
with chairs as clearly communicating property claims). 
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may redirect political energy and identity outward and strengthen these 
broader forms of solidarity. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have 
described alternatives to gemeinschaft solidarity. Durkheim conceptual-
ized “organic societies” based on complex, interdependent roles within 
society with strong norms associated with the roles.291 Building on this 
foundation, Portes and Vickstrom define organic solidarity as “univer-
salistic rules and their embodiment in specific roles.”292 The interde-
pendencies and specialization in organic society promote cohesion and 
cooperation that secure solidarity.293 In a similar vein, Max Weber de-
scribed bureaucracies as centralized, hierarchical organizations bound 
together by rational laws, specialization in individual tasks and bureau-
cratic structure, and the demands of the tasks to be accomplished (alt-
hough as Daniel Kreiss notes these ideals “rarely function in the real 
world as they do on paper”).294 
Solidarity may also come from common commitments or shared mor-
als. Drawing from Aristotelian thought, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
writes of the shared moral community.295 Multiculturalism theorists sug-
gest that shared values, history, and enthusiasm for “deep diversity” 
may, if not create, at least sustain broader social solidarity.296 General-
ized trust, or the belief that strangers can be trusted, binds societies to-
gether.297 And the sociological theory of professionalism describes the 
development of the professional role and its normative focus on univer-
salistic standards of science and expertise, service to the community, and 
291 See Durkheim, supra note 288, at 132–33. 
292 See Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 473. In more recent writing, task solidarity 
across the military has emerged as an argument for how the military can preserve solidarity 
in the face of heterogeneity of sexuality. See Gregory Herek, Unit Cohesion and the Military 
Mission, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/military_cohesion.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
293 See Durkheim, supra note 288, at 104–05. 
294 See Max Weber, Economy and Society 956, 973–75 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978); see 
also Daniel Kreiss et al., The Limits of Peer Production: Some Reminders from Max Weber 
for the Network Society, 13 New Media & Soc’y 243, 249 (2011).  
295 See, e.g., Alasdair MacIntrye, After Virtue 251–54, 258 (1984) (criticizing Enlighten-
ment individualism and advocating a return to the Aristotelian tradition of socially under-
stood virtue and a shared vision of morality). 
296 See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 188–91 (1995) (discussing theories of 
social unity for polyethnic and multi-nation states).  
297 See Dietlind Stolle, Trusting Strangers—The Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspec-
tive, 31 ÖZP 397, 397–99 (2002), available at http://www.oezp.at/pdfs/2002-4-02.pdf (defin-
ing and discussing generalized trust). 
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service-delivery rather than the identity of the client.298 Although some 
aspects of the professional role appear overstated, professionalism does 
create commonality among professionals as well as between profession-
als and clients through the norm of impartial service-provision. 
Stepping back, each of these theories is a form of generalized solidari-
ty, by which I mean a form of solidarity that extends beyond one’s im-
mediate group or territorial enclave. The source of generalized solidarity 
in the accounts above varies between intensive social interdependencies 
and universal, or at least broadly shared, norms, morals, or trust. For my 
purposes, the point is not to endorse one choice but rather to discuss al-
ternative sources of solidarity that sound not only in one’s community 
but also in society more broadly. In the residential property setting, the 
specific forms of generalized solidarity available vary by context, and 
even geography, and multiple forms overlap and reinforce one another. 
Admittedly, there is still much to learn about building generalized soli-
darity and I don’t claim that generalized solidarity will reliably trump 
bonding capital (thought it may lessen its harms and convey other bene-
fits to residential life). Rather, my claim is that generalized solidarity is 
available to forestall any descent into anomie or normlessness.299 
Interestingly, open property markets themselves can be one form of 
generalized solidarity—though not the most broadly inclusive or neces-
sarily the most desirable. Eighteenth-century economic writers described 
a “gentle commerce” that brings people together and forces them to con-
sider and account for the interests of far-flung others in order to trade.300 
Carol Rose has posited a socializing role of property, writing about how 
property markets can place people into contact with others far from their 
geographic home and social niche and inculcate norms and trust.301 To 
extend these ideas, it may be that property has the capacity not only to 
socialize but also to help develop generalized solidarity by structuring 
open markets and even playing fields of rules for participants to inter-
298 See Bryan S. Turner, Talcott Parsons, Universalism and the Educational Revolution: 
Democracy Versus Professionalism, 44 Brit. J. Soc. 1, 14 (1993).  
299 I have previously discussed the fact that alternative forms of solidarity or bridging ties 
do not remedy or trump the dark side of local capital. In this section, my point is different: 
alternative forms of solidarity hold other values for society and can substitute for any reduc-
tions in local social capital. 
300 Carol M. Rose, Whither Commodification?, in Rethinking Commodification 402, 419 
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).  
301 Id. at 402, 412–13, 419 (describing how imperfect information can encourage dense 
social networks, long-term relationships, and more complex social structures). 
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act.302 Indeed, this may be part of the intensely negative reaction to prac-
tices such as mortgage lending discrimination and redlining, which not 
only impose individual harms but also sully the universalizing rules of 
the market. The dark side of residential social capital offers a fresh per-
spective on the longstanding debate about market commodification and 
alienation.303 Upon closer view, legal and market institutions may play a 
larger socializing and liberalizing role in residential property than per-
ceived by social capital exponents. And residential social capital, despite 
its cheerful mantle of sociability, can assume anti-social, factional, and 
illiberal forms. 
CONCLUSION 
Social capital has beguiled property law with its claims of efficiency 
and self-governance through sociability and territorial cooperation. The 
enthusiasm for social capital has obscured its costs and tradeoffs to 
property markets, governance, and residential diversity. This Article of-
fers a fuller accounting of the dark side of local social capital and its ca-
pacity to close off residential property. I contend that we should be skep-
tical of social capital’s primacy to property institutions (and vice versa), 
realistic about its benefits, and cognizant of its capacity for harm. And if 
social capital, and correspondingly my account of its dark side, proves 
too nebulous to gain traction on property issues, we must turn from so-
cial capital and direct legal responses to context-specific harms and ben-
efits. 
302 Allport’s seminal theory of optimal conditions shows that lessening prejudice and in-
group bias through contact, or integration, requires that participants interact on a relatively 
level playing field of status, goals, norms, and laws. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prej-
udice 250–55, 267 (1958).  
303 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1870 (1987) 
(expressing concern about the commodifying and anti-social nature of markets). 
